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By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

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12 February 1945

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-EIGHT,
Commander SAN FABIAN Attack Force, and
Commander Task Group SEVENTY-EIGHT POINT ONE.
(Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force).
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, and
Commander LUZON Attack Force.
(Commander SEVENTH Fleet).

Subject: Report of the LINGAYEN Operation - SAN FABIAN Attack Force.

Enclosure: (A) CTF 78 Operation Plan 103-44.
(B) CTG 78.1 Attack Order 2-44.
(C) Table of Assignment of Shipping. - p.36
(D) Chronological Report of Events. - p.41

1. Object and Concept of the Operation.

(a) The object of the LINGAYEN Operation was the prompt seizure of the Central LUZON Area, the destruction of the principal garrisons, command organizations and logistics of hostile defense forces in the PHILIPPINES; the denial to the enemy of the northern entrance to the SOUTH CHINA SEA; and the provision of bases for the support of further operations against the JAPANESE.

(b) The concept of this operation, which was the initial and largest single operation in a series comprising the occupation of LUZON, visualized a major amphibious assault from NEW GUINEA and LEYTE bases, to destroy hostile forces in Central LUZON, reoccupy the MANILA-CENTRAL PLAINS Area, establish bases as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the support of operations to the northward of the PHILIPPINES and the complete occupation of LUZON. The initial lodgement to be followed by consolidation to include seizure of the crossings of the AGNO River, a rapid advance spearheaded by armor to seize communications and airfields in the SAN FERNANDO (PAMPANGA) Area, destruction of hostile forces, and the occupation of MANILA.

(c) The tasks assigned the SAN FABIAN Attack Force (Task Force 78) were:

(1) Transport, protect and land the FIRST Corps, U.S. Army (6th and 43rd Infantry Divisions, reinforced, with the Corps troops) at H-hour on S-Day, on the eastern shore of LINGAYEN GULF in the DAMORTIS Area.

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(2) On S/2 day land the 158th RCT (reinforced) on WHITE Beach in the DAMORTIS Area of LINGAYEN GULF. If directed by Commander LUZON Attack Force, take command of the Reserve Group, 25th Division (reinforced), on its arrival in the objective area on S/2 day and land that division on designated beaches. Land the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion and 13th Armored Group in the objective area on S/2 for assembly in reserve and call forward.

(3) Direct and control the movement of and provide escorts for all reinforcement and supply echelons scheduled to arrive in the objective area subsequent to S/2 day.

(4) Upon departure of Commander LINGAYEN Attack Force assume operational control of, and provide escorts for, all returning unloaded ships of both Attack Forces.

(5) Route all ships for turn-around and for return to Pacific Ocean Areas in accordance with letter of instructions furnished by Commander LUZON Attack Force.

(d) S-Day was initially planned for 20 December 1944, but was postponed to 9 January 1945. H-hour was 0930 (I).

2. General Situation (Enemy and Own).

(a) Enemy

Naval

The operational strength of the JAPANESE Navy was grouped into two main forces. One force was based in the EMPIRE-FORMOSA Area and consisted of 4 BB, 2 CV, 2 CVL, 2 CVE, 2 CA, 2 CL and 15/20 DD. The other force was based in the SINGAPORE-INDO CHINA Area and consisted of 2 BB-XCV, 2 CA, 2 CL, and 10/15 DD. In addition there were an estimated 5 DDs or DEs operating in the PHILIPPINE Area. The estimated force of 70 submarines was based mainly in the EMPIRE. The naval units in the inland seas of the PHILIPPINES consisted of a limited number of midget submarines and small patrol craft. Allied air and naval superiority precluded any sustained enemy naval activity in the immediate theater of operations.

Air

Despite the operational facilities provided by his

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airfields in Central and Northern LUZON and in FORMOSA, the enemy was unable or unwilling to make an all-out effort in the air against our forces. Strikes prior to S-Day by the 5th and 13th Air Forces and by the THIRD Fleet accounted for 700 enemy aircraft in LUZON, FORMOSA and OKINAWA. Strikes subsequent to S-Day apparently prevented large scale enemy air reinforcements.

Ground

Prior to S-Day the enemy ground strength in LUZON was estimated at 204,500 troops, composed of 89,000 combat and 115,500 base and service troops. Reinforcement of LUZON had continued at an accelerated pace, with possibly 20,000 troops landing during the first ten days of December. In the immediate vicinity of the objective area, charged with the security of the LINGAYEN PLAIN, there were an estimated 35,000 troops, including two divisions, a mixed brigade, and an armored unit of at least one battalion. An examination of the beaches after our landing indicated that no determined defense of the beaches had been contemplated. Subsequent developments showed that no major defense was planned by the enemy at any point between the beaches and the AGNO River. It was evident, however, that the enemy intended to hold all the hill country to the north and east of our beaches and had constructed many gun emplacements and other defenses throughout this area.

(b) Own

Naval

The Second Battle of the PHILIPPINES gave the Allied Forces unquestioned control of the waters east of the PHILIPPINES. The proximity of the THIRD Fleet to the area of operations and the threat of Allied submarines made a sortie of the JAPANESE Navy from the EMPIRE into the waters immediately west of LUZON a hazardous undertaking. The Bombardment and Fire Support Group of our Attack Force was equal in power to any raiding force the enemy could send against it.

Air

Land-based planes from MINDORO, LEYTE, MOROTAI, SANSAPOR, PALAU and SAIPAN, together with the carrier-based planes of the THIRD Fleet and SEVENTH Fleet, effectively neutralized the enemy air force to

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such an extent that enemy planes were encountered singly or in small groups. Regular and special air searches covered FORMOSA, CHINA, INDO CHINA, BORNEO and the SOUTH CHINA SEA.

Ground

The allied armies had broken all organized resistance on LEYTE. Enemy ground forces in NEW GUINEA and HALMAHERA were effectively neutralized. United States Philippine Forces controlled most of MINDANAO, BOHOL, PANAY and the southern sections of CEBU and NEGROS.

3. Landing Area.

(a) LINGAYEN GULF is a generally rectangular area about fifteen miles wide and twenty-five miles in length. It is open to the northwest and any swell on the west coast of LUZON from the north or west usually results in appreciable surf on the beaches of the Gulf. The approaches are clear of navigational hazards. The only navigational hazard inside the Gulf of any importance is a shoal area off the eastern part in the vicinity of DAMORTIS. The entire gulf area is of mineable depth. Unlimited anchorage areas exist in the inner part of the Gulf.

(b) The entry plan for Task Forces 78 and 79 was so coordinated that the four attack groups arrived off their respective beaches almost simultaneously on a total front of about 12 miles. There was no difficulty encountered in the deployment of all forces into their positions.

(c) The entire inner end of the Gulf from PORT SUAL to DAMORTIS is bordered by sandy beaches. The offshore depths at the beaches vary considerably in different areas. The selection of beaches for landing the FIRST Corps, 43rd Infantry Division and 6th Infantry Division was based on the scheme of maneuver of the land forces. Hydrographic information indicated that boats and landing craft smaller than LSTs would have little difficulty in unloading. Offshore depths on all beaches indicated that LSTs would require pontoon causeways to unload. This was correct except on beaches to the northward of SAN FABIAN (WHITE 1 and 2) where it was found that the depths were such that LSTs could beach at any stage of the tide with almost dry ramps. This had not been indicated by any previous information. Causeways previously scheduled for this beach were diverted to other beaches where they were required. Fortunately, WHITE Beaches 1 and 2 were also partially protected

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from the swell and had little surf. This circumstance contributed materially to the rapidity of unloading of LSTs in the SAN FABIAN Attack Force area. Unloading of LSTs over pontoon causeways on beaches to the southward of WHITE 1 and 2 was slow due to the surf and consequent difficulty in keeping the pontoon causeways in operation. It was again demonstrated that pontoon causeways are a poor substitute for a good LST beach.

4. Organization of Naval Forces.

(a) The LUZON Attack Force was composed of two attack forces and a reinforcement group:

The SAN FABIAN Attack Force (TF 78)	- Vice Admiral BARBEY
The LINGAYEN Attack Force (TF 79)	- Vice Admiral WILKINSON
Reinforcement Group (TG 77.9)	- Rear Admiral CONOLLY

(b) In direct support of these forces there were:

Bombardment and Support Group (TG 77.2)	- Vice Admiral OLDENDORF
Close Covering Group (TG 77.3)	- Rear Admiral BERKEY
Escort Carrier Group (TG 77.4)	- Rear Admiral DURGIN
CVE-DE Hunter-Killer Group (TG 77.5)	- Captain CRONIN
Minesweeping and Hydrographic Group (TG 77.6)	- Commander LOUD
Screening Group (TG 77.7)	- Captain McLEAN
Salvage and Rescue Group (TG 77.8)	- Commander HUIE
Service Group (TG 77.10)	- Rear Admiral GLOVER

(c) The SAN FABIAN Attack Force (Task Force 78), SEVENTH Amphibious Force, reinforced by units of the Pacific Fleet was organized as follows:

Task Group 78.1 (WHITE Beach Attack Group)	- Vice Admiral BARBEY
Task Group 78.5 (BLUE Beach Attack Group)	- Rear Admiral FECHTELER
Task Group 78.7 (Screen)	- Captain DUGAN
First Supply Group (Under CTG 77.9 until arrival objective area)	- Captain ABBOTT
Task Group 78.9 (Second Supply Group)	- Captain MANEES

Ships assigned to the various Task Groups are shown in enclosure (A)

The following is a summary of ships, by types, comprising the SAN FABIAN Attack Force (Task Force 78).

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<u>Transport Types</u>	<u>Landing Ships and Craft</u>	<u>Special Types</u>	<u>Combatant Types</u>	
1 AGC	6 AKA	137 LST	5 LCI (Gunboat)	27 DD
1 RAGC	4 AK	20 LSM	3 LCI (Mortar)	18 DE
20 APA	5 LSD	12 LCT	16 LCI (Rocket)	6 FC
6 AP	1 LSV		13 LCI (Smokers)	8 SC
2 APH	109 XAK (Liberty)			

(d) The THIRD Fleet, composed of fast carrier groups, operated in support of this operation.

5. Organization of Land Forces.

(a) The Land Forces of the SAN FABIAN Attack Force consisted of the FIRST Corps, the principal elements of which were as follows:

FIRST Corps	- Major General SWIFT
(Landed on S-Day WHITE Beaches)	
6th Inf. Div., plus supporting units	- Major General PATRICK
(Landed on S-Day BLUE Beaches)	
1st RCT	
20th RCT	
63rd RCT	
43rd Inf. Div., plus supporting units	- Major General WING
(Landed on S-Day WHITE Beaches)	
103rd RCT	
169th RCT	
172nd RCT	

The 158th RCT was landed on WHITE Beach 1 on S/2 day for the purpose of advancing northward towards DAMORTIS.

The 25th Infantry Division (reinforced), commanded by Major General MULLINS was the SIXTH Army Reserve. This division was to be landed on S/2 day at the beach to be designated by the Commanding General SIXTH Army. The 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion and 13th Armored Group were also to be landed in the objective area on S/2 day at beaches designated by the Commanding General SIXTH Army. The 25th Division, 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion and 13th Armored Group were all landed by Commander SAN FABIAN Attack Group. The 25th Division and 13th Armored Group were landed on WHITE Beaches, the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion was landed on BLUE Beach.

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6. Air Forces Available.

(a) Strategic Support

(1) By fast carriers, Central Pacific Force.

Task Group 38, composed of three fast Carrier Groups, each consisting of two CVs and two CVLs, protected the van of the line of advance, providing continuing support by attacks on enemy air bases, aircraft and shipping in the general area north of 15° N. latitude. This force was at all times interposed between the JAPANESE Home Fleet and our line of advance to block any sortie and attack by that fleet.

Specific targets attacked by this force were Northern LUZON and FORMOSA.

(2) By Air Forces, Southeast Asia.

The 14th and 20th Air Forces based in the CHINA, INDIA-BURMA theater assisted in protecting the van of our line of advance by continuing attacks on enemy air bases and aircraft in the land area bordering the SOUTH CHINA SEA, especially on FORMOSA.

(3) By Air Forces, Southwest Pacific.

The 5th and 13th Air Forces protected the left flank and rear of the line of advance by continuing attacks on enemy bases, aircraft and shipping south of 17° N. latitude. Specific targets included SOUTHERN LUZON, CENTRAL PHILIPPINES, MINDANAO, CELEBES, HALMAHERA and BORNEO.

(4) By Air Forces, Central Pacific.

The 7th and 21st Air Forces protected the right flank and rear of our line of advance by attacking enemy bases, aircraft and shipping in the general area east of 130° E. longitude. Specific targets included the BONIN ISLANDS, YAP, and TRUK ISLAND.

(b) Direct Support.

Eighteen Escort Carriers provided for direct support the equivalent of six carriers for the SAN FABIAN Attack Force.

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Two groups of attack bombers of the Army Air Force, Southwest Pacific Area provided for direct support the equivalent of one group of A-20s for the SAN FABIAN Attack Force.

(c) Search Aircraft.

To provide timely information of enemy positions and movements, search aircraft of the 5th, 7th, 13th, 14th, 20th and 21st Air Forces plus Naval Aircraft of the 3rd, 5th and 7th Fleets were employed over the vast area of operation wherein JAPANESE air, surface and sub-surface forces were operating.

7. Planning.

The initial planning for the LINGAYEN GULF Operation began at HOLLANDIA, NEW GUINEA about 5 November 1944. Conferences were held at the SEVENTH Fleet and SIXTH Army headquarters at HOLLANDIA. It was decided that the THIRD Amphibious Force would land the FOURTEENTH Corps on beaches in the LINGAYEN Area and the SEVENTH Amphibious Force would land the FIRST Corps on beaches in the SAN FABIAN Area. S-Day was tentatively set as 20 December 1944.

Planning began on this basis and shipping was so allocated. In the meantime a preliminary operation was being planned for the occupation of MINDORO, with a target date of 5 December. Some of the ships to be used in the LINGAYEN Operation were also committed to the MINDORO Operation.

The distance from HOLLANDIA to the LINGAYEN GULF Beaches is 2150 miles, and some of the troops that had to be picked up were 800 miles to the rear of HOLLANDIA. With the nine-knot LSTs and the time involved in loading, this meant that initial movements of ships had to start prior to 30 November. On a very tight schedule for replenishment and movement, plans were made to meet the target date of 20 December and ships distributed to loading ports. After a partial distribution had been effected, the target dates for the MINDORO and LINGAYEN operations were delayed to 15 December and 9 January, respectively. Plans were revised to meet the new target dates. This delay of 20 days provided sufficient time for the loading of transports and replenishment which would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish and still meet the original target date of 20 December.

8. Training and Rehearsal.

Both the 6th and 43rd Infantry Divisions had previous amphibious experience and training. The 43rd Infantry Division completed a refresher

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course at AITAPE during September 1944 and the 6th Infantry Division completed a training period at MILNE BAY during February and March 1944. The FIRST Corps Staff had periodic instruction and training at the Amphibious Training Center MILNE BAY over an extended period of time.

Combat experience was gained by the 6th Infantry Division at SANSAPOR and TOEM, and by the 43rd Infantry Division in the RUSSELLS and at MUNDA. Thus troops experienced in combat and amphibious landings were landed by TF 78 in the assault landings.

Transport groups were directed to rehearse for the amphibious operation by the Commander SAN FABIAN Attack Force (CTF 78), the WHITE Beach Transport Group rehearsing the assault ship-to-shore movement at AITAPE and the BLUE Beach Transport Group rehearsing at SANSAPOR.

These rehearsals conformed as nearly as possible to the assault ship-to-shore movement of the actual operation and all units involved made every effort to carry out the rehearsal as realistically as was possible. However, no supplies or equipment were unloaded since insufficient time was available to permit reloading. It is the exception in this area when the Army conducts a full scale rehearsal, including off loading all equipment and stores. As a result, off loading at the far shore and the handling of supplies over the beach continues to be a problem. The LVTs and LVT(A)s of the WHITE Beach group actually landed and carried out maneuvers ashore prior to their return to their assigned carriers.

All maneuvers and timed operations, including sortie, forming of cruising dispositions of the transports and positioning in the "transport area" were rehearsed, and the SAN FABIAN Attack Force was considered ready for the scheduled operation in the LINGAYEN GULF Area of LUZON, P. I.

9. Transport Loading.

(a) Planning.

Prior to the arrival of assigned shipping, preliminary planning was carried out jointly by SEVENTH Amphibious Force, SIXTH Army and FIRST Corps at HOLLANDIA, DUTCH NEW GUINEA. It was determined that the major elements of FIRST Corps - 43rd Division, 6th Division, and FIRST Corps troops - would load at AITAPE, SANSAPOR, and HOLLANDIA, respectively. In addition, SIXTH Army troops scheduled to land in the SAN FABIAN Area would load at

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MILNE BAY, ORO BAY, FINSCHHAFEN, LAE, HOLLANDIA, BIAK, NOEMFOOR, and LEYTE. SIXTH Army reserves, the 25th Division, would load at NOUMEA, and the 158th RCT would load at NOEMFOOR.

Based on cargo and troop estimates submitted, allocation of shipping was as follows:

FIRST CORPS

43rd Division

8 APA 16 LST
3 AP 10 LSM
3 AKA 1 XAK
2 LSD

6th Division

8 APA 1 AKA 13 LST
3 AP 2 AK 10 LSM
1 APH 2 LSD 1 XAK
1 LSV

Corps Troops

2 APA
1 AP
1 AKA
11 LST

SIXTH ARMY

25th Division

9 APA 1 AK
2 AP 2 XAK
1 AKA

158th RCT

10 APD
3 APA
1 AKA
5 LST

Army, Service, AAF

3 APA 4 LCI
1 APH 29 LST
2 AKA XAKs as
designated

For resupply - by SIXTH Army

6 LSD (turnaround)
112 LST
XAKs as designated

CTG 77.9 was assigned the mission of lifting the 25th Division at NOUMEA, the 158th RCT at NOEMFOOR, and service units at MILNE BAY, ORO BAY, LAE, FINSCHHAFEN, and LEYTE. The balance of SIXTH Army units as well as all of FIRST Corps were lifted by CTG 78. Upon arrival of the shipping in this area, the final assignment of assault elements was made.

(b) Loading.

The twenty-day delay in the LINGAYEN Operation greatly eased the loading problem. Both the 43rd and 6th Divisions were staged in areas

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which had no harbor facilities, and were open to the sea where at times loading was suspended because of surf on the loading beaches. In general, loading had to be accomplished during the morning hours while the sea was comparatively calm. Because of this condition, approximately 15 days were required at AITAPE and SANSAFOR to load all APs, APAs, AKAs, AKs, LSMs and LSTs.

In addition to vehicles and combat equipment, the following supplies accompanied troops to the objective:

Class I	- 10 D/S	Class IV	- 30 D/S (except Engineer)
Class II	- 10 D/S	Class V	- 2 U/F combat units
Class III	- 15 D/S		- 3 U/F service units

Following is cargo average for all type ships loaded:

Type	No. Vehicles	Bulk Tons	Total Tons
AP	43	125	257
APA	71	175	364.4
AKA	127	1028	1494.2
AK	165	1500	2282.6
LST	72	170	474.9

Since it was necessary for all ships to make a fast turn around in order to bring in reinforcement troops, cargo limitations were so imposed that APs and APAs could be unloaded in one day, AKAs in two days, and AKs in three to four days. Cargo limitations were:

APAs	- 450 tons	AKs	- 3000 tons
APs	- 300 tons	LSTs	- 600 tons
AKAs	- 1500 tons		

10. Approach to the Objective.

Task Group 78.1 (WHITE Beach) with the FIRST Corps Headquarters and 43rd Infantry Division embarked, took departure from AITAPE, NEW GUINEA at 1600 on S-12 (28 December 1944). The sortie from AITAPE was made in accordance with Annex BAKER to CTG 78.1 Attack Order 2-44, enclosure (B) hereto. The movement to the objective area was in accordance with CTF 78 Operation Plan 103-44, enclosure (A) hereto.

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The Task Group was formed in a modified circular cruising disposition, course and axis 308° T, speed 9 knots. The guide was the Force Flagship (BLUE RIDGE) in station 0.5090. Destroyers, destroyer escorts, PCs and SCs formed the screen. Four destroyers of the screen, one ahead, one on either flank, and one astern were assigned radar guard sectors. Picket stations were not assigned. The main body was formed in a column of types as follows: (a) transport group (APAs, AKAs, AKs, and LSDs); (b) LCI group - modified as rocket boats and smokers; (c) LSTs; and (d) miscellaneous group consisting of two tankers (AO), and LST ammunition ship, and a net cargo ship (AKN). Astern of these types an area was assigned the escort carriers.

The route followed was as prescribed by Commander LUZON Attack Force Operation Plan 17-44. The route passed through LEYTE GULF, SURIGAO STRAIT, MINDANAO SEA, SULU SEA, MINDORO STRAIT, and SOUTH CHINA SEA to LINGAYEN GULF. Alternate routes were provided should the tactical situation require their use. This route for part of the distance, was about 30 miles to the westward of the route used for the LEYTE Operation, with the result that all shipping returning from LEYTE, having been routed 30 miles to the westward of that track, was encountered.

At 1040 on 31 December 1944, the Escort Carrier Group, Task Unit 74.4.4 consisting of two CVEs (KADASHAN BAY and MARCUS ISLAND) and two destroyer escorts (R.S. BULL and R.M. ROWELL), reported to CTF 78 for duty and took station in the CVE area astern of the formation. The CVE group established an anti-submarine patrol and a combat air patrol.

Task Group 78.5 (BLUE Beach) with the 6th Infantry Division embarked, took departure from SANSAPOR on 30 December 1944. This group effected rendezvous with Task Group 78.1 at 1200, 3 January 1945, taking station 14 miles astern. At the same time the LST group of Task Force 79 coming from the Admiralties took station 14 miles astern of Task Group 78.5. These groups proceeded in company, but as separate tactical units. The escort carriers were then stationed astern of Task Group 78.5. The two CVEs furnished the ASP and CAP for all three groups.

Enroute to LEYTE GULF several sound contacts were made on 1 and 2 January, but upon developing, the results were negative. Hunter-Killer tactics were employed in each instance. On the morning of 2 January the task group was snooped by a JAP BETTY. On 3 January the CAP shot down a JAP FRANCES which was closing the formation and then about 20 miles away.

Commencing at daylight on 3 January all escorts were fueled from the SCHUYLKILL. At 1200, 4 January the tankers and other units destined for LEYTE were detached and proceeded on ahead.

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Upon arriving at the entrance of LEYTE GULF, the formation was joined by ships that had loaded there for the assault, including ten LSMs, an ammunition LST, a fleet tug, a salvage ship, some LCI fire fighters, and several Army communication ships. A similar group of ships joined Task Group 78.5. In addition, a MINDORO resupply convoy also joined the formation and took station astern of the LSTs of Task Force 79. At 2000 on 4 January, while passing through LEYTE GULF, the Close Covering Group (TG 77.3) consisting of four light cruisers and eight destroyers took station ten miles ahead of the formation. This group operated independently of Task Force 78, but maintained station in the van or on the flank until arrival off the objective area.

Passage through SURIGAO STRAIT was made without incident. On the afternoon of 5 January, while in the MINDANAO SEA, a Japanese midget submarine fired two torpedoes at the Close Covering Group, which missed. Upon firing the second torpedo the submarine breached. CTF 78 directed the ASP to the scene, and one plane made depth charge and rocket attacks. The plane reported the submarine rolled over upon completion of these attacks. The TAYLOR closed in and succeeded in ramming the submarine. The submarine is believed to have been sunk. Later, two torpedoes were fired at the LST unit of Task Group 78.1, indicating the presence of another midget submarine, these also missed. Hunter-Killer operations were instituted but with negative results. On the night of 5-6 January a group of enemy planes - about 15 in number - passed over the formation. All fire was withheld and the enemy was apparently unable to spot the formation. No action resulted.

On 7 January while in the SULU SEA and south of MINDORO STRAIT, rendezvous was made with a tanker group. The escorts of all three task groups were fueled, and on completion, the oilers returned to MINDORO.

During the evening of 7 January while in the CHINA SEA, a dusk air raid was delivered by a small group of JAP planes. The LST 912, of Task Group 78.5 was crash dived. Minor topside damage and a few casualties resulted and the ship continued in formation. Two JAP planes were shot down by ships' anti-aircraft fire.

That night the disposition of the escorts was changed to meet the threat of a possible enemy surface attack. The Close Covering Group dropped back to the left flank of the convoy to cover the approach from the west and southwest. Four destroyers of Task Group 78.1 were placed on either flank of the task group and at five miles from the axis to meet attacks from ahead and from the east. One destroyer was stationed five miles in the van. Duties of the inner anti-submarine screen were taken over by the DEs, PCs and SCs. Task Group 78.5 adopted a similar disposition.

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Shortly after 2100 on 7 January a Tomcat reported a surface contact distance 30 miles, bearing 060° on course 220. At 2156 the BLUE RIDGE picked up the contact bearing 068°, distance 19.5 miles on course 280, speed 16 knots. The Tomcat was directed to circle and observe. The right flank destroyers (CHARLES AUSBURNE, BRAINE, SHAW and RUSSELL) shortly afterward picked up the contact and were directed to close and destroy. Our destroyers opened fire on the enemy at a range of 10,000 yards and closed to 1100 yards. At 2255 the enemy, a Japanese destroyer of the HOTSUKARU Class was sunk. No damage was inflicted on our ships.

For the remainder of the night of 7-8 January the convoy was continuously snooped by enemy planes. Our night fighters were successful in shooting down four of them. The Close Covering Group opened fire on several occasions and flares were dropped in their vicinity.

At dawn of 8 January the convoy was again under air attack. The planes appeared to concentrate mostly on the CVEs astern of Task Group 78.5. This unit was under continuous attack from 0644 until 0803. The combat air patrol shot down six planes and damaged several others. At 0751 a Jap plane, damaged by AA fire, crashed into the starboard side of the KADASHAN BAY, causing a 15-foot hole at the waterline. Five fighters on deck were damaged and the gasoline system knocked out. Fire and flooding were soon brought under control, though the ship was down five feet by the bow. The MARCUS ISLAND landed and serviced KADASHAN BAY planes until repairs could be effected.

At 0759, during the same raid, the CALLOWAY, a transport of Task Group 78.5, was crash dived on the starboard side of the superstructure. Damage was confined to topside, casualties were light and the ship continued in formation.

The remainder of the passage to LINGAYEN was uneventful. Paravanes were streamed prior to dark on the 8th and Task Group 78.5 closed Task Group 78.1 to the minimum practicable distance during the night. Task Group 78.1 passed through the reference points sufficiently in advance so that Task Group 78.5 could pass at the scheduled times. Paravanes were recovered commencing at 0530 on the 9th, approaching the transport area. At 0646 Commander Task Group 78.1 executed the signal to "Deploy". All ships then proceeded as directed in CTG 78.1 Attack Order 2-44.

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11. Landing. (H-hour 0930)

Sunrise - 0724 Moonrise - 0245
Low tide - 1052 High tide - 2000

(a) WHITE Beach #1 (800 yards)

Initial assault in 27 LVTs from 2 LSTs.

<u>WAVE</u>	<u>NO. & TYPE</u>	<u>LAND</u>	<u>TROOPS (Prog. Total)</u>
1	12 LVTs	H	264
2	12 LVTs	H/3	528
Free	3 LVTs		594
3	6 LCVF	H/8	810
4	6 LCVF	H/13	1026
5	6 LCVF	H/18	1242
6	6 LCVF	H/23	1458
7	1 LCM	H/28	1488
8	3 LSM	H/38	1650
9	4 LST	H/70	3250

(b) WHITE Beach #2 (1000 yards)

Initial assault in 27 LVTs from 2 LSTs.

<u>WAVE</u>	<u>NO. & TYPE</u>	<u>LAND</u>	<u>TROOPS (Prog. Total)</u>
1	12 LVTs	H	264
2	12 LVTs	H/3	528
Free	3 LVTs		594
3	12 LCVF	H/8	1026
4	12 LCVF	H/13	1458
5	12 LCVF	H/18	1890
6	12 LCVF	H/23	2322
7	12 LCVF	H/28	2754
8	6 LCM	H/33	2934
9	6 LCT	H/38	3234
10	4 LCM	H/45	3354
11	5 LSM	H/55	3654
12	6 LST	H/70	6054

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(c) WHITE Beach #3 (1000 yards)

Initial assault in 27 LVTs from 2 LSTs.

<u>WAVE</u>	<u>NO. & TYPE</u>	<u>LAND</u>	<u>TROOPS (Prog. Total)</u>
1	12 LVTs	H	264
2	12 LVTs	H/3	528
Free	3 LVTs		594
3	12 LCVP	H/8	1026
4	12 LCVP	H/13	1458
5	12 LCVP	H/18	1890
6	12 LCVP	H/23	2322
7	2 LSM	H/28	2442
8	8 LCM	H/33	2682
9	12 LCVP	H/38	3114
10	12 LCVP	H/43	3546
11	12 LCVP	H/48	3978
12	2 LCM	H/53	4038
13	10 LSTs	H/70	8038

At 0830 all landing craft had been launched and loaded and were proceeding to the line of departure in accordance with the schedule. The first waves landed on WHITE Beaches 1 and 2 on schedule, but on WHITE Beach 3 the first wave was five minutes late. Succeeding waves landed in accordance with the schedule intervals.

There was no initial opposition to the landing and the troops proceeded inland. That there was no opposition indicated the effectiveness of the naval bombardment that preceded the landing. Bombardment of the beaches began on S-2 Day and continued right on up to S-Day with over 7500 4.5" rockets being delivered on the beaches immediately preceding H-hour. Aircraft bombing and strafing of the beaches was not used. It is believed to be more effective to keep the beach under ship bombardment and rocket fire rather than stop and shift to air bombardment and strafing during that period immediately before H-hour. Air bombardment is highly desirable in the rear areas, particularly on reverse slopes, and on targets out of range of naval gunfire. This procedure has been followed in this area with success.

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The assault landing was made with extremely light casualties. The LCVPs and LCMs made dry ramp landings on all beaches. However, as expected, difficulty was experienced in beaching LSTs and LSMs. WHITE Beach 3 was unsuitable for those types of ships, and all the BLUE beaches required pontoons. However, WHITE Beaches 1 and 2 were found to be satisfactory and all supplies and equipment for WHITE beaches were unloaded over those two beaches. Due to beach and surf conditions BLUE Beach became untenable so that commencing on S/4 day all supplies and equipment for BLUE Beaches were unloaded over WHITE Beaches 1 and 2.

Pontoons as causeways and barges were carried forward on LSTs, but due to existing beach conditions and surf they were found to be of little value. Though experienced personnel manned the pontoons, many of them broached and became unserviceable.

At 1000 on S-Day enemy mortar fire opened up on WHITE Beach 3, hitting several LSMs and causing light casualties and minor damage. Enemy mortar and artillery fire continued intermittently on WHITE Beaches on S-Day and in the afternoon reached the extent that it was necessary to stop unloading for about three hours and retract the LSTs. One LST was hit and suffered a few casualties and superficial damage.

Each night until S/4 enemy artillery would open up on the beaches for about thirty minutes, generally between 2300 and midnight. It had little effect other than harassing, causing few casualties and slight damage.

All APAs, APs and LSDs were unloaded on S-Day. The LSMs and LCTs were used to assist in unloading assault shipping and were of great assistance. Due to beach and surf conditions the pontoon barges were mostly used as ferries for carrying cargo from the AKAs and AKs to LCVPs and LCMS that were lying to off the beach. While this required a double handling of cargo, it did facilitate unloading.

Only two enemy air attacks were made on S-Day - one at 1317 by two planes. One plane crashed the MISSISSIPPI and the other crashed the AUSTRALIA. The second attack was at dusk-no damage was inflicted, though bombs were dropped and straddled several ships.

Smoke screens covering the entire area were layed prior to dawn and dusk, and it is believed that this is one of the most effective means of defeating the enemy dawn and dusk air attacks.

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12. Naval Gunfire Support.

(a) Naval gunfire support of the operation was divided into the following three phases:

(1) Pre-S Day bombardment. Ships participating were as follows:

NEW MEXICO	(OBB)	MINNEAPOLIS	(CA)	LOWRY	(DD)
WEST VIRGINIA	(OBB)	AUSTRALIA	(CA)	LAFFEY	(DD)
MISSISSIPPI	(OBB)	SHROPSHIRE	(CA)	O'BRIEN	(DD)
WALKE	(DD)	A. M. SUMNER	(DD)	BARTON	(DD)
MOALE	(DD)	INGRAHAM	(DD)		

(2) Scheduled bombardment on S-Day. Ships participating were those listed in (1) above plus the following:

CONVERSE	(DD)	LAVALLETTE	(DD)	WILSON	(DD)
FOOTE	(DD)	STACK	(DD)		
JENKINS	(DD)	STERRETT	(DD)		

(3) Close supporting call fire missions after H-hour through S+6 day. Ships participating were as follows:

MINNEAPOLIS	(CA)	MORRIS	(DD)	HOWORTH	(DD)
SHROPSHIRE	(CA)	MUSTIN	(DD)	NORMAN SCOTT	(DD)
RUSSELL	(DD)	CLAXTON	(DD)	STACK	(DD)
CHAS. AUSBURNE	(DD)	WILSON	(DD)	CONVERSE	(DD)
LANG	(DD)	FOOTE	(DD)	STERRETT	(DD)
BRAINE	(DD)	SHAW	(DD)	MC NAIR	(DD)
DRAYTON	(DD)	MC DERMUT	(DD)	LAVALLETTE	(DD)
MELVIN	(DD)	JENKINS	(DD)		

(b) Pre-S Day bombardment.

The initial phase of the bombardment started on S-3 day when the town of SAN FERNANDO, PORO POINT, and the east side of LINGAYEN GULF were taken under fire. The selection of S-3 day to start the bombardment was based primarily on the estimate that three days would be required to complete minesweeping operations in LINGAYEN GULF and that minesweepers would require continuous cover during that time. The bombardment was also to afford cover to the underwater demolition team. Since the minesweepers failed to locate any moored mines and therefore completed their sweeps

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ahead of schedule, it was apparent that the bombardment could have been of shorter duration, especially in view of relatively weak defenses encountered by the Bombardment and Fire Support Unit. Bombardment commenced on WHITE and BLUE Beaches and vicinity on S-2 day, with a very heavy bombardment being delivered on S-1 day. The pre-S-day phase covered landing beaches, principal roads, high ground overlooking the beaches, and gun positions. This bombardment was not observed by Commander Task Force SEVENTY-EIGHT, but reports received indicate that enemy gun emplacements were knocked out near the entrance to LINGAYEN GULF (SAN FERNANDO), and the beach defenses were destroyed or abandoned. Commander Bombardment and Fire Support Unit reported on S-1 day that suitable targets were conspicuous by their absence.

(c) Scheduled S-Day Bombardment.

(1) SAN FABIAN Fire Support Unit (3 OBB, 3 CA, 8 DD) conducted a bombardment between 0700 and 1130, and Fire Support Units P (3 DD) and Q (4 DD) delivered a scheduled bombardment from 0845 to 0940. All units conducted bombardments according to plan and the results were devastating. There was no opposition on WHITE and BLUE beaches at H-hour. Fire after 0930 (H-hour) was placed on the flanks of landing beaches, high ground overlooking the beaches, important roads and towns.

(2) Fifteen LCI(Rocket) delivered about 7,500 4.5 barrage rockets along WHITE and BLUE Beaches between 0923 and 0930 (H-hour). The rocket continues to be an extremely effective close support weapon for just prior to H-hour when naval gunfire necessarily has to shift away from the beaches.

(3) LCI(Mortar) were used for the first time by the SEVENTH Amphibious Force, and proved very effective on high ground and reverse slopes overlooking WHITE Beaches.

(d) Close Support after H-hour.

(1) Call fires requested by Shore Fire Control Parties were delivered through S+6 day. These missions were marked by the outstanding performance of the DDs assigned this duty. Accurate observed fire was delivered at ranges up to 14,000 yards. Approximately 10,000 rounds of 5" 38 ammunition of all types was fired in support of the 43rd Infantry Division and 158th RCT, reinforced, during this phase. This operation marked the first employment of the JASCO by the SEVENTH Amphibious Force. The 75th JASCO with the 43rd Division conducted a great many fire missions and functioned very well throughout

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the entire operation. The 293rd JASCO with the 6th Division was very soon out of gun range and did not handle any fire missions.

(2) Communications in general were very good. However, on S-Day many shore Fire Control Parties reported via the Control Net that they were unable to contact support ships on assigned frequencies for urgently required fire missions. They were permitted to remain on the Control Net leading to considerable overloading of this circuit. As soon as this situation was corrected the communication nets provided were completely adequate and no serious failures or delays were noted, although relaying was often necessary.

(3) Night Harassing Fire and Illumination was provided from S-night through S+6. Average expenditures in a divisional sector averaged from 10 to 25 rounds per hour per night. Front line units of the 43rd Division continually requested this type of support which was prearranged for each night whenever possible. The fact that no night counterattacks developed in illuminated areas testifies to the effectiveness of starshell illumination.

(e) No reports of material casualties other than those due to enemy action were received. However, many ships had previously sustained damage to guns and fire control equipment as a result of enemy suicide planes. That all such damaged ships carried out their scheduled assignments reflects great credit on ships' personnel and is a tribute to the performance of our ordnance equipment.

(f) Ammunition expenditures by ships supporting the SAN FABIAN Attack Force were as follows:

16" HC	422 rounds	5" Com.	102 rounds
14" HC	1,470 rounds	5" Ill.	900 rounds
8" HC	1,585 rounds	5" WP	307 rounds
8" AP	7 rounds	4" HE	1,328 rounds
5" HC	1,838 rounds	4.2" Mortar(HE)	1,650 rounds
5" AAC	20,993 rounds	4.5" Rockets	7,500 rounds
		(HE)	

13. Air Support.

In general, the Commander Support Aircraft, SAN FABIAN Attack Force operated in conformity with the requirements laid down in the Transport Doctrine, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet.

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(a) Organization.

(1) The Commander Support Aircraft, LUZON Attack Force retained general supervision over the Commanders Support Aircraft of the SAN FABIAN and the LINGAYEN Attack Forces and specifically controlled the Fighter Direction, the General Warning, the Local Air Warning and the Air-Sea Rescue functions. The Support Aircraft Control Unit, SAN FABIAN Attack Force, the FIRST Corps Staff and the 43rd Division Staff were embarked in the BLUE RIDGE and functioned in the Joint Operations Room where coordination between support aircraft, naval gunfire and Army artillery was effected.

(b) Enroute to the Objective.

(1) While enroute to the objective, the SAN FABIAN Attack Force, composed of two convoys (TG 78.1 and TG 78.5) plus an LST convoy of Task Force 79 plus a MINDORO resupply convoy proceeded in a column of convoys. This very lengthy (about 40 miles) column was protected by two CVEs and a limited number of land-based fighters, who provided a Target Combat Air Patrol and a Target Anti-Submarine Patrol over the leading convoy (TG 78.1), which was controlled by Commander Task Force 78, and Local Combat Air Patrol and Local Anti-Submarine Patrol over the remainder of the convoys, which was controlled by the CVEs.

(2) A total of 120 sorties were flown by the Target Anti-Submarine Patrol, which were controlled by Commander Support Air, and 504 sorties (360 Navy and 144 Army) were flown by the Target Combat Air Patrol, which were controlled by the Force Fighter Director.

(3) The advantage accruing from the use of airborne radar at night to search the area ahead of a convoy was proven by a Fighter Director controlled Tomcat which made radar contact with an unidentified vessel in the van of the convoy and outside the range of our shipborne radars. This contact was maintained and reports submitted until our light surface units could establish contact. This action resulted in the quick destruction of an enemy destroyer which was threatening our convoy.

(c) At the Objective.

A brief resume of the Support Aircraft operations of the SAN FABIAN Attack Force is outlined below:

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(1) S-Day Operations.

Air Support was confined almost entirely to pre-assigned targets designated by the Commanding General FIRST Corps. These targets consisted mainly of enemy installations and heavily defended positions at a sufficient distance inland to permit Aircraft and Naval Gunfire to carry out simultaneous bombardment. Principal objectives of air strikes also included enemy reinforcement movements and road networks over which these reinforcements moved. One group of Army A-20s was turned over to the control of Commander Air Support Control Unit - SAN FABIAN at 0842 and were employed against enemy reinforcement movements along principal road nets in, and leading toward, FIRST Corps territory. At H-hour a request from FIRST Corps was made to strafe enemy positions behind the railroad embankment from SAN FABIAN town to a point approximately 3,500 yards north, but the mission was cancelled since it could not be coordinated with Naval Gunfire in that area. In addition, four Smoke Planes were held in readiness from H-30 until H+75 to conceal our beaches from enemy positions on 300-foot and 500-foot hills, but their actual use was never requested by FIRST Corps. No requests were made by the Air Liaison Parties ashore for Direct Support Missions on the first day.

A total of 71 tons of bombs were released and 468 rockets were fired by Naval Aircraft and 13 tons of bombs released by Army Aircraft in the following sorties on S-Day:

51 VF (Direct Support)
24 VF (Ex-TCAP)
67 VTB (Direct Support)
35 VB (Army Direct Support)
9 VTB (Air Observers)

(2) S/1 day to S/6 day.

Air targets available in the SAN FABIAN Area were sufficient to warrant the use of all Support Aircraft assigned, as well as additional Support Groups provided by Commander Support Aircraft - LINGAYEN and Fighter Sweeps by Target Combat Air Patrol planes. However, there were very few Close Support Missions, the majority of requests from Air Liaison Parties and FIRST Corps Headquarters being for strikes against enemy concentrations and installations in general areas, distant from our front line positions. In this respect, the tendency of Army Ground Forces to leave the responsibility for selection of targets in the hands of Commander Air Support Control Unit - SAN FABIAN is pointed out.

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As a result, the observations and information reported by airborne observers and coordinators was especially valuable. Because of the steadily diminishing number of requests for Close Support Missions by the Ground Forces, a reduction of the size of strike groups was requested and granted commencing S/6.

Throughout the entire period, the two Air Observers were constantly employed in reconnaissance and observation missions. The assignment covered all types of reconnaissance, but due to the enemy's elaborate system of highway and railroad networks, principal attention was focused on his reinforcement movements. Particularly in the last three or four days, the two observers provided very valuable information to the Ground Forces, as well as to Commander Air Support Control Unit - SAN FABIAN as indicated by the numerous missions requested of them from both sources.

Six photographic missions were flown at the request of FIRST Corps and Division Commanders. All of these missions were successful and particular commendation was passed to the pilots executing them by the Commanding General of the SIXTH Division.

Total tonnage dropped during the period from S/1 through S/6 amounted to 137 tons, with 1208 rockets fired by Naval Aircraft and 340 tons of bombs dropped by Army Aircraft. Sorties flown in Direct Support were:

NAVY

244 VF (Direct Support)
16 VF (Ex-TCAP)
288 VTB (Direct Support)
46 VTB (Air Observers)
6 VTB (Photo Missions)

ARMY

47 VF (Direct Support)
347 VB (Direct Support)

The above summary includes tonnage of bombs and sorties flown by strike groups released to us by Commander Air Support Units - LINGAYEN.

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(3) Missions flown

36 - Requested by Air Liaison Party (13 missions requested by Air Liaison Party were rejected, usually due to unsuitable targets, too close friendly front lines and inadequate marking of both.

37 - Targets of opportunity selected by Observers and Coordinators within a general area designated by Commander Support Aircraft.

6 - Photo missions.

1 - Beach observation.

(d) Air Communications.

(1) Communications for Commander Air Support Control Unit - SAN FABIAN during the LINGAYEN Operation were, on the whole, satisfactory. The magnitude of the operation, with the natural resultant demand for increase in number of frequencies required by activities participating, presented additional problems in trying to develop satisfactory communications for all. Interference from CW transmitters was experienced on all nets, at times so strong on the Support Air Request and Air Support Command circuits that reception was impossible and much repetition was necessary. The Staff Communication Personnel were very cooperative, however, and in most cases where the CW was traced as originating on the Headquarters Ship the traffic was changed to a secondary frequency. In instances where the transmitting stations were on other ships or ashore, it was impossible to improve reception.

(2) The assignment of frequencies for the many Air Support circuits required for this operation proved to be well planned and distributed. Only between Support Air Observation and Support Air Request circuits was the lack of separation of Commander Air Support Unit - SAN FABIAN frequencies directly responsible for any communication difficulties experienced.

14. Communications.

Communications in general, during the LINGAYEN Operation showed considerable improvement over those of previous operations.

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Circuit discipline and procedure was satisfactory except in a few instances of poor quality of the latter which indicated a lack of trained personnel.

The problem of adequate voice communications facilities for maneuvering the large convoy of various types of vessels, underway to the assault area was solved by having all ships except LSTs, LCIs and LSMs on a common VHF frequency. The station unit commanders of these types were on this common frequency and in turn used other assigned frequencies to maneuver their station units. This worked out successfully.

Upon reaching the assault area the beaching circuits were put in operation and operated satisfactorily. However, the volume of traffic gradually increased as the unloading progressed until these circuits and visual communications were operating to one hundred percent and at times with a backlog. It was obvious that some commands did not thoroughly disseminate the information contained in the operation plans. This was indicated by the unnecessary number of despatches requesting information on matters covered in the plan. Also some landing craft and transport commands were late in entering or failed to enter the assigned nets until prompted. It is mandatory that the communication personnel have access to the Communication Plan.

In addition to the unnecessary despatches which caused circuits to be loaded it was noticed that a large percentage of despatches were verbose, apparently voice transmissions were not written in despatch form prior to being transmitted. It is obvious that a greater number of shorter despatches which convey the same thoughts can be handled in the same circuit time than the longer ones.

Visual signalling was handicapped by the larger number of ships present and the large area involved. Conditions which developed in the operating area necessitated the transmission of several ASP messages. These despatches helped to swell the traffic load, both visual and voice. Difficulty was experienced in delivery to new arrivals of the Liberty ship type which had no voice calls. The time possible for visual signaling was cut down due to the necessity for making smoke in the mornings and evenings, no visual signalling was allowed during darkness. Several delays in the delivery of visual traffic occurred due to lack of alertness of the signal bridge personnel.

Requests to the Flagship for communication personnel indicated that some ships experienced a shortage of communication personnel, either being under-complemented, or the complement not sufficient to meet the needs.

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No intentional enemy interference was experienced. While all circuits were not always free from outside transmissions, at no time was the communications of the operation handicapped.

Comparatively few requests to the Flagship for materiel replacement parts indicated that the performance of communication materiel was satisfactory.

15. Operations on Shore.

H-hour was scheduled for 0930, 9 January 1945. The first wave hit the beaches as follows: WHITE 1 and 2, 0930; WHITE 3, 0935; BLUE 1 and 2, 0939. No opposition was encountered on the beaches and the troops proceeded 300 yards inland without receiving any opposition. The troops landing on BLUE Beaches had, by 1040, advanced 2000 yards inland in LVTs, meeting no opposition. At 1430, Major General WING assumed command of the 43rd Division ashore, and at 1445 Major General PATRICK assumed command of the 6th Division. By nightfall on S-Day the 6th Division had consolidated its position on the Second Phase line and established contact with XIV Corps elements on the right flank. Reports from the 43rd Division were few, but by nightfall they had advanced approximately 4000 yards beyond SAN FABIAN, having established Division C.P. in that town. On the left flank they established a road block on the SAN FABIAN-RABON road without advancing much beyond their initial position. WHITE Beaches were subjected to mortar fire about a half hour after the landing, this fire continuing intermittently during the day and throughout the night, causing delay in unloading. The fire apparently came from the reverse slopes on high ground on the left flank of WHITE Beach 1, this high ground not having been occupied by our forces.

The advance continued on S/1 day, meeting only isolated points of resistance. Our casualties continued to be very light. Unloading was still delayed on WHITE 1 and 2 by enemy mortar fire and on BLUE Beaches by heavy surf.

SIXTH Division elements advanced as far as the towns of BALINGUEO, SANTA BARBARA and MAPANDAN. The 43rd Division advanced to the town of MANAOAG. Heaviest opposition came from the high ground to the left flank of the 43rd Division. The advance was aided by air strikes and naval gunfire support against pill boxes and troop concentrations.

Progress ashore continued steadily on S/2, the various elements in the advance tying in to form a definite front line position which approximated the initial plan.

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The 158th RCT landed to the left of WHITE 1 at 1000 on S/2 day and commenced an advance northward along the east coast of the bay on the SAN FABIAN-RABON Road. This advance was covered by naval gunfire support. The SIXTH Army Reserve (25th Division) landed on WHITE 3 at 1000 on S/2 day.

At 1100 General MacARTHUR established advanced headquarters at DAGUPAN.

At 1243 on S/2 day the Commanding General of FIRST Corps assumed command ashore as did the Commanding General of XIV Corps at 1530.

During the night, left flank positions and WHITE Beaches 1 and 2 were subject to mortar and artillery fire from the high ground flanking these positions.

Progress on the left flank was slowed by enemy units dug in on Mt. ALAVA, a 500-foot hill fronting left flank units.

Progress continued to be good on S/3 except in the left flank area where the advance was retarted by enemy units dug in on high ground. On S/4 day the 63rd RCT of the 6th Division was moved to the left flank for the purpose of taking the high ground which had been the source of constant trouble in that area. Their attack on this high ground continued throughout S/5 day and S/6. An enemy counterattack from the POZORRUBIO area was repulsed on S/5 day.

The Commanding General SIXTH Army assumed command of all SIXTH Army units ashore at 1430 on S/4 day.

By nightfall of S/6 day the 63rd RCT had occupied all of this troublesome area and had secured the left flank covering the advance about 1000 yards beyond DAMORTIS.

16. Unloading.

(a) Unloading of Assault Transports and Cargo Ships.

Transports and cargo type vessels in Task Force 78 were loaded for the operation as follows: APAs 450 tons; APs 300 tons; AKAs 1500 tons; and AKs 3000 tons. These loadings anticipated a single daylight unloading period for APAs and APs; a two-day 24-hour unloading period for AKAs; and a four-day unloading period for AKs. Beaches and surf conditions were

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generally satisfactory on S-Day and S+1 day for unloading small landing craft, and these schedules were met with the exception of the JUPITER, which required five days to unload.

Transports and cargo ships of Task Group 77.9 reported to Task Force 78 on S+2 day for unloading over WHITE Beaches. These ships were loaded with the 158th RCT, the 25th Division, which was the SIXTH Army Reserve, and with miscellaneous FIRST Corps and SIXTH Army troops and equipment. No data is available on the loading of the ships of Task Group 77.9, but it is believed that they were heavier loaded than ships of Task Force 78. This heavier loading, together with the added traffic across WHITE Beaches resulted in a slower discharge. The last transport of this group did not sail until S+4 and the last cargo vessel was not ready until S+6.

(b) Unloading LSTs.

Early on S-Day it was found that WHITE Beaches 1 and 2 were satisfactory for beaching LSTs, that WHITE Beach 3 was unsatisfactory, and that LST unloading on BLUE Beach could only be accomplished with the assistance of pontoon causeways. WHITE Beach 3 was therefore abandoned for LST unloading and all causeways were sent to BLUE Beaches. Despite difficult surf conditions causing the broaching of pontoon causeways on BLUE Beaches and the necessity for retraction from WHITE Beaches on S-Day due to enemy mortar and artillery fire, all LSTs in the S-Day convoy were unloaded by S+3 day. On S+4 day, by agreement with the SIXTH Army, unloading on BLUE Beach was discontinued and all unloading was shifted to WHITE Beach. While this made beaching more satisfactory it slowed up unloading as troops, equipment and supplies had to be moved a greater distance to dispersal and dump areas. This, together with the difficult conditions for unloading LSTs in the LINGAYEN Beach area, caused a considerable backlog of unloaded vessels of this type by S+6 day.

(c) Availability of Lighterage.

LCTs and LSMs were of invaluable assistance in unloading during the assault phase, especially in unloading APs and AKs, which do not have sufficient boats for their own unloading needs. These types of landing craft remained under the control of the Control Officer throughout the assault unloading phase.

LCMs of the Engineer Special Brigades were transported in APAs and AKAs in lieu of the ships' own LCMs. These craft were used to unload the ships to which they had been assigned, then to unload the ships in the same division and finally were assigned to the Control Officer for unloading the remainder of the assault shipping in the area. When the assault shipping

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was unloaded, these LCMs were released to the control of their respective Engineer Boat and Shore Regiments and were then to be employed in unloading critical material from merchant ships. However, such multiple transfers are better expressed here than were understood by the boat crew personnel with the result that many LCMs reported directly to the Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment after unloading the ships in which they were carried.

Pontoon barges were a disappointment. Though experienced personnel operated these barges, the majority of them broached on their first trip and the few remaining were thereafter unloaded into DUKWs or landing craft outside of the surf line. While these pontoon barges are excellent and inexpensive lighterage types, it is doubtful if they can be employed efficiently until after the beaches are surveyed and a satisfactory unloading location for them is found.

Upon departure of assault shipping, the Control Officers made LCTs available for unloading merchant ships, as requested by the SIXTH Army. The LCT is still the best lighterage for expeditious unloading in the assault stages. In this respect, the LCT (5) is considered superior to the LCT (6). LSMs were used for unloading assault shipping after discharge of their own loads, but were not used for unloading merchant ships.

17. Shore Party.

The experience in amphibious landings has indicated that the capacity of assault shipping to discharge cargo generally far exceeds the capacity of the Shore Party to receive it. Shortage of motor equipment to keep the beaches clear; shortage of cargo-handling equipment to remove cargo from the landing craft, and physical exhaustion of beach party personnel are definite limitations in unloading which must be recognized. Each piece of cargo-handling equipment in assault shipping displaces its tonnage of combat equipment. Each service soldier trained as a stevedore or longshoreman displaces a combat-trained soldier. A compromise must be effected and recognized by those charged with the planning and execution of the operation.

As has been stated before, the unloading of the 25th Division left much to be desired. This division was transported from NOUMEA. No follow-up shipping was available and the whole division had to be carried in one lift. The ALHENA, an AKA originally scheduled, was not available and three merchant ships had to be included in the 25th's convoy.

Investigation of the relatively slow unloading of the 25th Division revealed that this division had no shore party of its own. The

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Engineer Special Brigade employed in the operation was attached directly to the four assault divisions and to the 158th RCT. The movement of troops and equipment of the 25th Division across beaches allotted to the 43rd Division was evidently given low priority.

The performance of the Shore Parties in the unloading of assault shipping was very satisfactory. Except for WHITE Beach 1, the beaches were reasonably clear at all times. Enemy mortar and artillery fire slowed unloading on WHITE Beaches 1 and 2 and practically caused its cessation at night until S/4.

It is believed that the Engineer Special Brigade as organized in the Southwest Pacific Area is the most efficient Shore Party organization now functioning in amphibious warfare and that the permanent organizations of these regiments have contributed in a large measure to the success of amphibious operation in this theater.

Commencing with the ARAWA Operation, 15 December 1943, the SEVENTH Amphibious Force organized special beach parties entirely separate from those on the transports composed of three officers and seventeen men. These beach parties have landed with the shore parties in all amphibious operations held in the Southwest Pacific and have been found to be of great value. A particular advantage that has resulted from the use of these parties is that when the transports leave the area and their beach parties are withdrawn, these special parties remain and are of considerable help in connection with the unloading of Liberty ships. This was readily apparent in the LINGAYEN Operation.

Control Officers.

Two Control Officers, one for each Attack Group, were established off WHITE and BLUE Beaches. These officers controlled the landing waves in the initial landing, and later controlled all Navy lighterage except landing craft attached directly to APAs and AKAs. On S/3 day the Control Officer on BLUE Beach was withdrawn and the Control Officer on WHITE Beach assumed control of all waterborne transportation to the SAN FABIAN Beaches.

This operation again demonstrated the importance of the unloading phase. Not until sufficient heavy equipment and supplies have been landed can the troops carry on an effective campaign inland. The unloading phase cannot be considered more important than the ship to shore movement of the assault waves. It does, however, require as much control and supervision by the officers of both services charged with the success of the amphibious operations.

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18. Resupply and Reinforcement.

The resupply and reinforcement schedule for the Operation, in addition to the resupply of concurrent operations, in the PHILIPPINE Areas, presented a complicated and difficult shipping and loading problem. Total distances involved in a turnaround in some cases exceeded 5,000 miles. Pacific Ocean Area shipping utilized in the assault phase was made available, in part, for one turnaround trip for resupply or reinforcement. However, scheduled dates for release of various units at GUAM, GUADALCANAL, LEYTE, and PEARL HARBOR were specified, hence schedules were tight and no time was available for routine maintenance and upkeep of ships involved.

Time for loading was scheduled at a minimum and complete cooperation between ships' forces and Army units involved in loading was essential in order to meet the schedule. Dock space was available at only a very few loading points, consequently most loading was accomplished by transfer of cargo from the beaches by LCMs, LCTs, and LSMs to the cargo vessels.

Resupply echelons were scheduled as follows:

<u>Time of arrival at LINGAYEN Area</u>	<u>Type and No. Ships</u>	<u>Speed in Knots</u>	<u>Staging- Loading Area</u>	<u>Mileage from stag- ing area to LINGAYEN</u>
S/5	20 tugs, with barges, lighters in tow	4-5	LEYTE	865
S/5	26 LCT / 1 APC	6	LEYTE	865
S/12	7 LST 21 XAK (Liberties) 9 LSM	9	HOLLANDIA HOLLANDIA LEYTE	2090 2090 865
S/17	6 LSD (turnaround)	13	MOROTAI TOEM HOLLANDIA	1602 2006 2090
S/18	11 Transport types 18 XAK (Liberties) 73 LST (55 reinforcement) 18 resupply)	9	LEYTE HOLLANDIA LEYTE	865 2090 865

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S/30	4 Transport types	9	MOROTAI	1602
	11 Transport types		MAFFIN BAY	2900
			(via MANUS)	
	23 XAK		HOLLANDIA	2090
	58 LST (turnaround)		AITAPE	2200
			TOEM	2006
			HOLLANDIA	2090
			BIAK	1867
			NOEMFOOR	1809
			SANSAPOR	1864
			MOROTAI	1602
S/32	15 Transport types	15	BIAK via HOLLANDIA	2400
S/40	14 LST (turnaround)	9	HOLLANDIA	2090
			FINSCHHAFEN	2640
			EMIRAU	2545
	18 XAK		HOLLANDIA	2090

Escorts were extremely limited in number due to current operational requirements, commitments for immediate forthcoming operations, and operational and battle damage losses. Schedules had to be arranged on a "break off" and "pick up" basis.

All available shipping was used to the fullest extent to meet the following concurrent operations requirements:

- LINGAYEN reinforcement and resupply
- ORMOC resupply
- MINDORO resupply
- Forthcoming operations

Since the resupply for the LINGAYEN Operation has only recently started, it is impossible to state at this time as to whether the schedule as set forth can be accomplished. Any excessive delay in unloading at the objective area beaches or any delay in routing returning echelons, or loading of resupply cargoes, will necessarily result in either a delay in release of POA shipping, which is essential for other scheduled operations, or in a decreased or delayed supply of vital equipment in the LINGAYEN Area.

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19. Medical.

(a) Medical planning for the LINGAYEN GULF Operation was predicated on several factors--the number of Army and Navy personnel involved; the length of lines of communication; the relation of the various designated landing beaches to each other and their hydrographic conditions; the enemy's capabilities, which led to the assumption that casualties would be heavy, particularly on S-Day; and the number of casualty-care ships available.

The Medical Annex to the Operation Plan was based on "Casualty Doctrine, SEVENTH Fleet" and on "Casualty Doctrine and Medical Instruction for SEVENTH Amphibious Force" as well as on the Medical Annex to Commander Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area Operation Plan 17-44.

(b) Since heavy casualties were anticipated on S-Day, as stated above, maximum facilities in the S-Day echelon were deemed a necessity. There were nine LSTs that carried surgical teams, seventeen LSTs with one medical officer, and sixteen APAs that had three or four medical officers aboard. A lesser number of casualty-care LSTs were assigned to S/2 and S/4 echelons.

Six Surgical Team LSTs were designated to remain at LINGAYEN for casualty care until such time as the Army was equipped to offer definitive treatment ashore. Their medical personnel was augmented by the addition of two surgeons and five corpsmen to each ship, and their supplies were increased.

The LEYTE Operation indicated the urgent need of rescue vessels fitted to go alongside damaged ships and care for casualties. Accordingly, three PCE(R)s were designated for this purpose and two medical officers were assigned to each ship. However, one was damaged by a shell hit and only two were available at LINGAYEN. The PCE(R)s, as well as one Surgical Team LST, were anchored near the Flagship of SOPA so that they could readily be signalled visually to perform tasks. The Surgical LST held in reserve was used to relieve other surgical LSTs when it became necessary for them to retract and unload.

The location of the theater of operations and the tactical situation made it unadvisable for Geneva-protected AHs to enter LINGAYEN at an early date. Since the majority of the APAs were in the S-Day and S/1 echelons and departed the area as soon as they were unloaded, the APHs TRYON, RIXEY and PINKNEY were held in LINGAYEN to receive casualties from other ships and to evacuate them when ordered by SOPA.

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(c) SEVENTH Amphibious Force Beach Parties 2, 4, 5 and 6 were assigned to this operation. In addition, the Medical Beach Parties from nine APAs were sent ashore to remain until their ships sailed.

These Beach Party Medical Officers were furnished a list of ships' facilities. They were instructed to screen the casualties so that those requiring immediate surgery were sent to surgical teams and the walking wounded and patients with minor wounds were sent direct to APAs and other vessels. This method was designed to reserve the surgical teams for the more seriously injured.

(d) All casualty-care ships were ordered to load medical supplies to capacity prior to departure for their staging areas.

The Surgical Team LSTs at HOLLANDIA were furnished with 24 quarts of whole blood, twenty million units of penicillin, and one hundred ampoules of gas gangrene antitoxin as additional supplies. The USS WASATCH carried four hundred pints of blood to the forward area from the LST 464 at LEYTE. Later echelons brought from LEYTE blood that had been flown from the United States.

Ships remaining at LINGAYEN as casualty ships will be able to replenish from larger ships present, from arriving ships, and from Army sources ashore.

(e) As events proved, casualties on S-Day, and until our departure on S/6 were relatively light. However, the threat remained of the receipt of a large number of casualties at any time either from forces ashore or afloat and so the early casualties were evacuated as rapidly as possible on returning LSTs and APAs. USS RIXEY (APH) was sailed on S/6. Although not filled to capacity, she contained all the litter cases she could care for.

20. Comments and Recommendations.

(a) The use of smoke to completely blanket the ships at anchor and the beaches appears to be a most effective means of defeating the enemy dawn and dusk air attacks.

(b) Naval bombardment continues to prove its effectiveness -- "the landing was unopposed". It appears now, however, that the JAP is moving his defenses beyond the range of naval gunfire and that he is accepting the fact that he cannot stop the landing. The shore and beach defenses at SAN FABIAN had been evacuated, but many gun emplacements were being constructed back in the hills.

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(c) Prior to the LEYTE Operation, the naval bombardment preceding the amphibious landings held in the Southwest Pacific Area was limited to D-Day. On this operation naval bombardment, covering the minesweeping and underwater demolition teams, commenced three days prior to the landing. Minesweeping revealed no minefields, and the demolition team encountered no underwater or beach obstacles. In an effort to maintain tactical surprise, or at least to avoid disclosing until the latest possible moment the location of the beaches on which the landing is to be made, it is recommended that unless positive information is available to indicate the objective area is mined and the beaches planted with obstacles, that the naval bombardment be confined to that which is necessary to destroy or neutralize the enemy defenses.

(d) In this operation as in the LEYTE Operation the strategic supporting forces and attack forces were under dual command, creating divided responsibility.

(e) The photographic coverage of the beaches was highly satisfactory, however, the areas beyond the beaches were not adequately covered. Air Support can be aided greatly by vertical coverage of the areas beyond the beaches.

(f) In the BLUE RIDGE the CIC is located on the flag bridge and it is considered inadequate for Force Fighter Direction Control. The space is not large enough to accommodate the necessary personnel and there is mutual interference with the VHF equipment installed. It is recommended that CIC be relocated next to Air Support Operations in the Joint Operations room during the next overhaul and that new modern equipment be installed during this alteration.

D. E. BARBEY.

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TABLE OF ASSIGNMENT OF SHIPPING

TRANSPORT LOADING

WHITE BEACH

S-Day

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TROOPS</u>	<u>VEHICLES</u>	<u>TONS BULK</u>	<u>TOTAL TONS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
CAVALIER	1225	88	137.1	368.8	2 Bn, 169 RCT, Hq, 169 RCT
FELAND	865	53	145.9	232.4	1 Bn, 169 RCT
GOLDEN CITY	1125	43	172.9	356	3 Bn, 169 RCT
FAYETTE	1389	81	155.9	427.7	3 Bn, 169 RCT Hq, 169 RCT
HEYWOOD	1072	72	151.3	253.3	1 Bn, 103 RCT
LEEDSTOWN	1328	80	248.2	516.3	2 Bn, 103 RCT
CAPE JOHNSON	1217	41	-----	167	533 EB&S, 43 Div. Units
DuPAGE	896	81	179	372.8	1 Bn, 172 RCT, Hq, 172 RCT
FULLER	584	71	186	360.6	2 Bn, 172 RCT
WAYNE	814	67	213.7	384.7	3 Bn, 172 RCT
JOHN LAND	1184	61	79	249	3 Bn, 172 RCT
ELMORE	697	88			Hq, I Corps, 58 Sig, 409 Med.
THUBAN	413	118	1173.6	1545	470 AA, 43 Div. Supplies
AQUARIUS	297	142	873.4	1443.5	161 AA, 43 Div. Supplies
HERCULES	320	173	1535.5	2282.6	470 AA, 43 Div. Supplies
ARNEB	217	123	780	1280	58 Sig, I Corps, 3608 Ord.
MERCURY	350	150			340 Engr. Const. Bn.
APPLING	365	56	20	110	43 Fld. Hosp, 3608 Ord, Corps
WINGED ARROW	333	58	60	150	I Corps, 63 Port Surg Hosp.

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TABLE OF ASSIGNMENT OF SHIPPING

TRANSPORT LOADING

BLUE BEACH
S-Day

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TROOPS</u>	<u>VEHICLES</u>	<u>TONS BULK</u>	<u>TOTAL TONS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
FREMONT	845	119	70	402	6 Div.Hq, Div.FA, 80 FA
CALLAWAY	1317	113	102	406	Bn, 20 RCT, 80 FA
SUMTER	999	86	250	446	Bn, 20 RCT
STORM KING	1015	61	140	301	706 Ord, 6 Sig, 51 FA
MONITOR	238	42	200	580	466 AmphTrk, 51 FA
LEONARD WOOD	1289	103	186	457	1 RCT, 6 QM, 543 EB&S
O'HARA	1275	108	82	300	1 RCT, 1 FA, C, 263 Med.
PIERCE	1235	55	250	406	1 RCT, 1 FA, 6 Engr. Bn
LaSALLE	851	77	---	258	424 Med. Col.Co, 1st FA
ELECTRA	332	75	514	849	1 RCT, 293 JASCO, 480rd
JUPITER	128	156	2102	2892	20 RCT, 80 FA, 6th QM
BANNER	666	42	36	225	63 RCT, 53 FA, 6 Engr.
HERALD OF THE MORNING	1476	117	100	350	63 RCT, 53 FA, 293 JASCO
BARNSTABLE	1359	119	48	399	Bn, 63 RCT, 53 FA, 6th Med.
RIXEY	385	32	75	154	Hq.Co. 6th Div., 543 EB&S
AURIGA	250	74	1160	1485	161 AA Bn, 466 AmphTrk

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TABLE OF ASSIGNMENT OF SHIPPING

LST LOADING

WHITE BEACH

S-Day

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TROOPS</u>	<u>VEHICLES</u>	<u>TONS BULK</u>	<u>TOTAL TONS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
482	373	77	170	800	716 Tank Bn.
467	440	74	----	384	172 RCT, LVTs, 533 EB&S
474	556	77	----	387	172 RCT, LVTs, 533 EB&S
488	517	73	----	380	3750 QM TrkDet, 54 Evac.Hosp.
475	264	77	170	800	716 Tank Bn.
245	421		104	421	533 EB&S, 43 Sig, Hq. 43 Div.
123	425	57	104	400	192 FA, 470 AAA
451	298	52	96	454	192 FA, 470 AAA
470	395	65	----	403	169 RCT, LVTs, 533 EB&S
469	397	66	----	394	169 RCT, LVTs, 533 EB&S
454	307	70		464	118 EngrBri, 118 Med.)
125	395	65	173	630	533 EB&S, 181 FA, 809 Amph.Trk.
486	380	70	32	395	43 QM, 161 AAA, 470 AAA, 873 QM
452	340	65	127	460	533 EB&S, 43 QM, 470 AAA
22	389	69	----	378	103 RCT, LVTs, 98 Cml Bri.
456	390	80	----	355	103 RCT, LVTs, 43QM
463	296	85		370	I Corps, 52, 58 Sig, 989 SigSv.
466	278	74	170	550	I Corps, 52, 58 Sig, 989 SigSv.
680					Loaded TOEM, no report

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468) To ORANGE Beach with Air Warning equipment (SIXTH Army change).

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TABLE OF ASSIGNMENT OF SHIPPING

LST LOADING

BLUE BEACH

S-Day

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TROOPS</u>	<u>VEHICLES</u>	<u>TONS BULK</u>	<u>TOTAL TONS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
912	200	52	52	406	79 Engr.Const.Bn.
910	120	56		370	510 Engr.Lt.Pont.Co.
993	125	57		370	510 Engr.Lt.Pont.Co.
569	199	68			Co. A, 60 Sig.Bn.
555	467	50	191	580	1 RCT, LVTs, 3448 QM Trk.
581	532	43	170	520	1 RCT, LVTs, 543 EB&S
667	474	36	181	530	543 EB&S, 198 AAA
614	450	52	195	545	543 EB&S, 198 AAA, 706 Ord.
628	515	61	184	560	20 RCT, LVTs, 543 EB&S
582	531	60	183	540	20 RCT, LVTs, 543 EB&S
700	521	82	184	532	543 EB&S, 3448 QM Trk, 198 AAA
740	523	62	194	570	543 EB&S, 3448 QM Trk, 198 AAA
712	278	87	135	525	53 FA, 6 Engr. Bn.
777	162	75		394	543 EB&S, 6 Engr.Bn.
744	282	41	200	554	55 FA, 3 Plat, 289 FA, Obsn, Bn.
694	283	41	200	554	55 FA, 3 Plat, 289 FA, Obsn, Bn.
1017	301	70			99 Sig.Bn,Hq.6 Army, 135 Med.
126					No information
919)					
619)					
673)					
746)	6th Army Engr. Units loaded at LEYTE, no information				
741)					
991)					
631)					

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TABLE OF ASSIGNMENT OF SHIPPING

WHITE THREE

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<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TROOPS</u>	<u>VEHICLES</u>	<u>TONS BULK</u>	<u>TOTAL TONS</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
ZEILIN	1110	98	115	416	25th Div.Hq. 90 FA Bn.
LaPORTE	1231	86	117	375	161 RCT
PRESIDENT ADAMS	1078	95	259	447	161 RCT
PRESIDENT MONROE	1532	58	362	483	161 RCT
AUDRAIN					No information
ALGOL	218	238	795	1419	25th Div.
PREES. JACKSON	1024	73	286	539	Hq. 25th Div.
LAURENS	1304	60	375	575	35th RCT
OGONTO	1453	56	368	549	35th RCT
OXFORD	1323	77	298	539	27th RCT
LATIMER		53	311	498	27th RCT
COMET	946	48	173	285	27th RCT

BLUE-WHITE BEACHES

Sf2

WARREN	1290	72	200	370	Ascom
UVALDE	334	159	1200	1990	Ascom
OLMSTEAD	1391	74	200	386	6th Army Service
TRYON	1325	41	100	250	6th Army
WARRICK	350	135	1250	1820	6th Army
GILLIAM	646	61	200	361	6th Army Hq.
ADAIR	1012	58	276.5	447.8	158 RCT
HASKELL	1014	59	283.6	454.6	158 RCT
LEON	825	55	285	455	158 RCT
DIPHDA	195	117	818	1231.5	158 RCT
NEWMAN	144	---	---	---	158 RCT
LIDDLE	144	---	---	---	158 RCT
KEFHART	144	---	---	---	158 RCT
COFER	144	---	---	---	158 RCT
LLOYD	144	---	---	---	158 RCT
SCHLEY	144	---	---	---	158 RCT
KILTY	144	---	---	---	158 RCT
TALBOT	144	---	---	---	158 RCT
CROSBY	144	---	---	---	158 RCT
HERBERT	144	---	---	---	158 RCT
MANLY	144	---	---	---	158 RCT

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

SECRET

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

Task Force 78

and

Task Group 78.1

Philippines - Lingayen

26 December 1944

(S-14 Day)

Commander Task Force SEVENTY-EIGHT and Commander Task Group SEVENTY-EIGHT POINT ONE (Vice Admiral BARBEY, USN) in U.S.S. BLUE RIDGE departed HOLLANDIA, NEW GUINEA, Harbor at 1700 and proceeded to AITAPE escorted by U.S.S. JENKINS in accordance with CTF 78 Operation Plan 103-44 and CTG 78.1 Attack Order No. 2-44.

WEATHER

Overcast.

OPERATIONS

Proceeded for AITAPE, course 085° T, speed 9.5 knots, zigzag Plan 25. Shifted base course from 085° T to 107° T at 2025, and ceased zigzagging. Changed speed to 14 knots at 2045. At 2200 changed speed to 9 knots. Resumed zigzagging, Plan 25 at 2201.

Positions: 1800-2000 - Latitude 2°-30' S, Longitude 141°-10' E.

No important messages received or issued.

27 December 1944

(S-13 Day)

WEATHER

Fair. Sea moderate to calm.

OPERATIONS

Continued on course 107° T, standard speed 9 knots. Continued zigzagging in accordance Plan 25. Anchored AITAPE Harbor at 0604.

No important messages received or issued.

28 December 1944

(S-12 Day)

At anchor AITAPE.

WEATHER

Overcast. Sea moderate.

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Enclosure (D)

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

28 December 1944 (cont'd)

OPERATIONS

TG 78.1, consisting of the following listed ships and craft, sortied in accordance with Annex BAKER, CTG 78.1 Attack Order No. 2-44 at 1500: BLUE RIDGE (Flag); 20 transport types; 2 APc; 4 destroyers; 5 destroyer escorts; 3 PCs; 4 SCs; 31 LSTs; 22 LCIs; 1 AKN; and 3 tankers.

Formed modified circular cruising disposition C-2 with destroyers, destroyer escorts, PCs, and SCs in the screen, the Force Flagship (BLUE RIDGE) in station 0.5090. Course and axis 308° T, speed 6 knots. Increased standard speed at 1647 to 9 knots. Between 2000 and 2400 made six contacts with friendly merchant shipping, all of which passed close to the formation.

Positions: 1600 - Latitude 3°-01' S, Longitude 142°-26' E.
2000 - Latitude 2°-43' S, Longitude 142°-01' E.

No important messages received or issued.

29 December 1944
(S-11 Day)

WEATHER

Partly cloudy and light rains. Sea moderate.

OPERATIONS

Enroute objective area in cruising disposition C-2, speed 9 knots, course and axis 308° T, guide in BLUE RIDGE in station 0.5090.

0808 - USS GOLDEN CITY reported steering casualty and sheered out of column to port. Did not leave formation.

0817 - GOLDEN CITY regained position.

0915 - PC 1121 came alongside to deliver mail from AdCom and to receive mail from BLUE RIDGE.

0954 - PC 1121 cast off and proceeded to USS SHAW to deliver fighter director team transferred to SHAW from DASHIELL at HUMBOLDT BAY.

Positions: 0800 - Latitude 1°-42' S, Longitude 140°-49' E.
1200 - Latitude 1°-23' S, Longitude 140°-21.5' E.
2000 - Latitude 00°-47' S, Longitude 139°-42' E.

No important messages received or issued.

30 December 1944
(S-10 Day)

WEATHER

Cloudy. Sea moderate.

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

SECRET

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

30 December 1944 (cont'd)

OPERATIONS

Course, axis, speed, and disposition as before.

1000 - Speed increased to 9.5 knots.

1230 - LCI 358 lost strut bearing on one shaft and needed tow in order to maintain speed. CTU 78.1.5 directed LCI 777 to take LCI 358 in tow.

1315 - LCI 777 completed tow and both ships rejoined formation.

Positions: 0800 - Latitude 0°-28' N, Longitude 138°-00' E.

1200 - Latitude 00°-41' N, Longitude 138°-33' E.

2000 - Latitude 1°-24' N, Longitude 137°-35' E. . . .

No important messages received or issued.

31 December 1944

(S-9 Day)

WEATHER

Fair with intermittent rain squalls. Sea moderate.

OPERATIONS

Steaming as before on course 308° T, standard speed 9.5 knots, OTC of TF 78, and TG 78.1 in BLUE RIDGE (guide), cruising disposition C-2.

0545 - Escort carrier planes of TU 74.4.4 closed formation and established CAP and ASP.

0740 - Speed changed to 7 knots and changed course to 325° T.

1040 - CTU 77.4.4 consisting of following ships: MARCUS ISLAND (CVE 77), KADASHAN BAY (CVE 76); DES R.S. BULL, R.M. ROWELL (Rear Admiral SAMPLE in MARCUS ISLAND) reported for duty with TF 78 and established CAP and ASP patrols. BRAINE (DD) joined the formation. Increased speed to 8 knots.

1225 - PC 1125 reported sound contact.

1232 - Executed ships left 30° and came to course 295°.

1240 - PC 1149 reported sound contact negative.

1246 - Executed ships right 30° and came to course 325°.

1315 - Directed screen to cease patrolling.

1535 - JOY reported sound contact bearing 230° T.

1540 - JOY reported sound contact negative.

1615 - Directed screen to resume patrolling stations.

1641 - Changed course and axis to 320°.

2015 - Sighted convoy bearing 320° T, on opposite and parallel course, distance 18 miles. Executed ships right 30°, twice, in order to clear oncoming convoy, thence returned to base course by ships left 30°, twice.

Positions: 0800 - Latitude 2°-22' N, Longitude 136°-09' E.

1200 - Latitude 2°-44' N, Longitude 135°-51' E.

2000 - Latitude 3°-32' N, Longitude 135°-18.5 E.

No important messages received or issued.

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

1 January 1945
(S-8 Day)

WEATHER

Partly cloudy. Sea moderate.

OPERATIONS

TG 78.1 in company with TU 77.4.4 proceeding in cruising formation C-2 to objective area on course 320° T, speed 8 knots, in accordance with CTF 78 Operation Plan 103-44. CTF 78 and OTC in BLUE RIDGE.

0615 - SC 1052 ~~crossed~~ BLUE RIDGE and picked up O.M. mail for delivery to CTU 77.4.4.

0620 - SC 1052 cast off.

0719 - Course and axis changed to 315° T.

0753 - Formation speed increased to 9 knots.

0950 - ASP reported radar contact bearing 280° T, distance 30 miles, disappeared upon investigation.

1000 - Hunter-Killer groups ordered launched to investigate contact.

1005 - BRAINE ordered to investigate contact as part of hunter-killer group. BRAINE continued search until 1400, results negative; ship re-joined formation.

1045 - Changed formation course and axis to 335° T.

1150 - Speed increased to 9.5 knots.

1313 - THOMASON reported sound contact and delivered depth charges. Results negative, continued search until 1545, then rejoined formation.

1452 - RUSSELL reported sub contact and delivered depth charges - results negative. RUSSELL remained to search area. Regained contact at 1539 and again delivered depth charges with negative results, continued search until 1630, then rejoined formation.

1500 - Reduced speed to 7 knots and shifted fleet course and axis to 302° T.

1550 - Resumed speed of 9.5 knots.

1716 - Changed course 30° left by turn signal away from doubtful sub contact.

1728 - Resumed base course of 302° T.

1737 - Changed course 40° left by turn signal away from doubtful sub contact.

1753 - Resumed base course 302° T.

1800 - PC 598 ~~reported~~ mine close aboard; ordered to escort mine through formation and destroy by gunfire.

1855 - PC 598 reported object positively identified as mine and sunk by gunfire; returning to station.

1935 - JENKINS reported possible mine sighted close aboard. SC 1052 and THOMASON cautioned to keep sharp lookout. Object was an empty gasoline drum.

2100 - Reduced speed to 8.5 knots.

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

1 January 1945 (cont'd)

Positions: 0800 - Latitude 40-36.5' N, Longitude 134-39' E.
1200 - Latitude 40-59' N, Longitude 134-24' E.
2000 - Latitude 50-42' N, Longitude 133-31.5' E.

No important messages received or issued.

2 January 1945
(S-7 Day)

WEATHER

Fair and partly cloudy. Sea moderate.

OPERATIONS

Enroute objective area in cruising disposition C-2, formation course and axis 302° T, speed 8.5 knots. CTF 78 and CTG 78.1 in BLUE RIDGE (guide) at station 0.5090.

0605 - SC 1052 came alongside BLUE RIDGE to deliver two bags of O.M. mail

0608 - SC 1052 dropped one bag of mail over the side; searched for bag with negative results. Column 2, this station unit, directed to keep sharp lookout for floating mail bag and SC 1320 moved astern of Column 2 to search

0640 - SC 1052 came alongside BLUE RIDGE and delivered one remaining bag of O.M. mail.

0700 - Lost mail bag presumed to have sunk as all search results were negative. SC 1320 resumed station in screen.

1000 - Changed speed to 8 knots.

1007 - Plane from CTU 77.4.4 reports sighting two convoys bearing 120° T, distance 52 miles from fleet center, course 310° T, speed 8 knots.

First group identified as TG 78.5. 1015 second group identified as LSTs of TF 79.

1049 - DASHIELL came alongside to deliver and receive mail for TG 78.5.

1055 - SHAW reported enemy aircraft sighted visually bearing 030° T, distance 8 miles.

1059 - SHAW reports bogey appears to be BETTY type Jap plane bearing 065° from SHAW - 8 miles. DASHIELL cast off from alongside immediately. BLUE RIDGE went to GQ.

1101 - SHAW reported enemy plane disappeared over horizon.

1102 - All ships notified that plane picked up was identified as BETTY type; also given distance and true bearing.

1118 - Secured from GQ.

1126 - DASHIELL returned alongside to deliver and pick up mail.

1147 - DASHIELL cast off.

1420 - KIMMEL reported ~~sanar contact~~; later reported not sub (bearing 165° T, 1800 yards).

1422 - Executed emergency turn 30°.

1427 - Executed 30° turn to original course.

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CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

2 January 1945 (cont'd)

1435 - JOY reported sonar contact bearing 245° T, distance 1320 yards; later reported not to be sub.

1436 - Executed emergency turn 30°.

1450 - Executed 30° turn to original course.

2040 - Changed course and axis to 305° T.

Positions: 0800 - Latitude 6°-31' N, Longitude 132°-02' E.

1200 - Latitude 6°-46' N, Longitude 131°-34' E.

2000 - Latitude 7°-20' N, Longitude 130°-40' E.

No important messages received or issued.

3 January 1945

(S-6 Day)

WEATHER

Cloudy, intermittent showers, then fair. Sea moderate to rough.

OPERATIONS

Enroute to the objective area in cruising disposition C-2, formation course and axis 305° T, speed 8 knots. CTF 78 and CTG 78.1 in guide (BLUE RIDGE) at station 0.5090.

0600 - Fueling of screening vessels in pairs commenced in following order: KIMMEL and BRAINE, ROWELL and RUSSELL, JENKINS and BULL, DRAYTON and SHAW, JOY and NICKEL, THOMASON and LOUGH, LAVALETTE and SC 1320, PC 623 and SC 1319, PC 598 and SC 1273, SC 1052 and PC 1129.

0730 - KIMMEL completed fueling. Fueling continued in accordance CTF 78 despatch 020434 January.

0900 - Bogie picked up approaching formation. GQ ordered.

0902 - CAP ordered to intercept.

0925 - CAP shot down one FRANCIS.

0942 - All clear; secured from GQ.

1200 - TG 78.5 and LSTs of TF 79 took station astern of 78.1 at 14 and 28 miles respectively. Task Groups proceeded in company, but as separate tactical units. The Escort Carrier Group (74.4.4) took station in TG 78.5 and provided CAP and ASP for all three groups.

1711 - Unidentified aircraft picked up by radar. GQ sounded.

1730 - All clear; planes identified as friendly; secured from GQ.

1857 - APc 16 completed fueling alongside SCHUYLKILL and resumed station. Fueling of screen completed.

2045 - Changed course and axis to 310° T.

2228 - Picked up Skunk on SG radar.

2258 - Directed JENKINS to investigate Skunk.

2340 - JENKINS reported negative results of search.

2342 - Directed JENKINS to resume station.

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

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CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

3 January 1945 (cont'd)

Positions: 0800 - Latitude 8°-12' N, Longitude 129°-13.5' E.
1200 - Latitude 8°-30' N, Longitude 128°-47' E.
2000 - Latitude 9°-01' N, Longitude 127°-51' E.

No important messages received or issued.

4 January 1945
(S-5 Day)

WEATHER

Partly cloudy to cloudy with intermittent showers. Sea moderate to rough.

OPERATIONS

Course, axis, speed and disposition as before. Numerous friendly planes passed the formation heading in a northwesterly direction at various times throughout the 0400-0800 watch.

SC 1273 delivered mail from DU PAGE to LST 474 and rejoined screen.

PC 1129 delivered mail to LA VALLETTE and rejoined screen.

DAY came alongside BLUE RIDGE to receive mail for CTG 78.5.

1202 - The following ships withdrew from the formation and proceeded on duty assigned: LOUGH, THOMASON, JOY, RIO GRANDE, KURUMBA, SCHUYLKILL, LCIs 28, 358, 971, 1007 and APCs 16 and 19.

1245 - Changed course and axis to 325°T and speed to 8.5 knots.

1332 - AUSBURNE, CONVERSE, FOOTE, STERRETT and STANLEY reported for duty. Directed STERRETT and STANLEY to report to CTG 78.5.

1425 - Changed course and axis to 335° T.

1535 - Changed course and axis to 320° T.

1545 - Convoy from LEYTE joined TG 78.1. Consisted of the following ships: DDs C. AUSBURNE, CONVERSE, FOOTE; LSMs 41, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 127, 129, 268, 269; PCE(R)s 848, 849, 850; LCI(R)s 31, 34, 71, 72, 73, 74, 331, 342; LST 618; CABLE, HIDATSA, APACHE (Army); TULSA, FP 47, and LCI 759.

- The following ships joined TG 78.5: DDs STERRETT and STANLEY; LSTs 619, 673, 746, 919; LCI(R)s 230, 337, 338, 341, 342, 612, 613, 982, 1022; EGERIA, and POTAWATOMIE.

1557 - TG 78.1 formed disposition C-3 composed of following ships: BLUE RIDGE (Flag); 20 transports; 9 destroyers; 2 destroyer escorts; 3 SCs; 3 PCs; 3 PCEs; 1 FP; 30 LCI; 22 LSTs; 10 LSMs; 1 AKN; 1 ARS; and 2 ATs.

1605 - Changed formation course and axis to 302° T.

1629 - Changed speed to 7.5 knots.

1654 - Changed formation course and axis to 283° T.

1805 - Changed course and axis to 262° T.

1839 - Changed course and axis to 242° T.

1944 - Changed course and axis to 224° T.

1948 - Made contact with TG 77.3 (Close Covering Group) bearing 265°T, distance 4 miles, passing ahead. Consisted of: CLs PHOENIX (F), MONTPELIER, DENVER; DDs NICHOLAS, O'BARRON, TAYLOR, HOPEWELL, ELETCHER, RADFORD.

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CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

4 January 1945 (cont'd)

2000 - Received information TG 77.3 would take station ten miles ahead of this formation.

2043 - Changed course and axis to 180° T.

2345 - Changed course and axis to 200° T.

Positions: 0800 - Latitude 09°-53.5' N, Longitude 126°-38' E.

1200 - Latitude 10°-04' N, Longitude 126°-19' E.

2000 - Latitude 10°-30' N, Longitude 125°-25' E.

IMPORTANT MESSAGES RECEIVED

CinCPOA despatch to CinCSWPA recommending maximum use of submarine and aircraft to locate JAPANESE force recently in CAMRANH BAY, CAPE ST. JACQUES vicinity.

CTF 77 despatch setting forth enemy air situation as of 2 January 1945. Enemy air strength at 31 December 1944 given as follows:

FORMOSA

135 Fighters

55 Torpedo and Dive Bombers

55 Medium Bombers

95 Float and Observation Planes

340 Aircraft - Total FORMOSA Strength

PHILIPPINES

LUZON-VISAYAN AREA

230 Fighters

80 Torpedo and Dive Bombers

30 Medium Bombers

65 Float and Observation Planes

455 Aircraft - Total LUZON-VISAYAN AREA Strength

MINDANAO

25 Fighters

15 Torpedo and Dive Bombers

15 Medium Bombers

20 Float and Observation Planes

75 Aircraft - Total MINDANAO Strength

Total Enemy Aircraft in the PHILIPPINES - 530.

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CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

4 January 1945 (cont'd)

BORNEO-CELEBES AREA

105 Fighters
10 Torpedo and Dive Bombers
35 Medium Bombers
40 Float and Observation Planes
190 Aircraft - Total BORNEO-CELEBES AREA Strength

Recent photo coverage indicates that approximately 300 of the 455 aircraft believed to be in the LUZON-VISAYAN AREA are concentrated on the airfields in the immediate vicinity of CLARK FIELD and that approximately 50 aircraft are based at FLORIDA BLANCA Airfield. Possible initial NIP reaction to Pre M-1 air strikes will be to attempt maximum dispersal of aircraft among LUZON bases. Reports indicate camouflaged aircraft under trees vicinity BAUBAN Airfield. Report received that special suicide attack squadron operates from MABANACAT. BALEP and VIGAN airfields reported not operational. All other LUZON airfields believed serviceable.

No important messages issued.

5 January 1945

(S-4 Day)

WEATHER

Partly cloudy. Sea calm.

OPERATIONS

Task Group 78.1 in company enroute objective area in accordance with CTF 78 Operation Plan 103-44. Cruising in disposition C-3. Course and axis 200° T, speed 7.5 knots. Guide in BLUE RIDGE (OTC) in station 0.5090. Close Covering Group (TG 77.3) is stationed 10 miles ahead, and TG 78.5 is 14 miles astern, and LSTs of TF 79 are stationed 28 miles astern.

0031 - Changed course and axis to 222° T.

0121 - Changed course and axis to 244° T.

0555 - Passed Emergency Victor to formation, unidentified aircraft in vicinity. Ship went to GQ.

0601 - Bogey identified as friendly by USS KIMMEL.

0700 - Ship secured from GQ.

0721 - HOPEWELL came alongside to deliver mail.

0725 - HOPEWELL cleared side.

1036 - Changed course and axis to 240° T.

1515 - CTG 77.3 reported torpedo wake from the North. CTF 78 directed ASP to scene - plane spotted sub, dropped depth charges and fired rockets. Sub was then rammed by TAYLOR.

1548 - JENKINS reported plane on SELINO ISLAND; was directed to close and destroy if positively identified as enemy. Plane was a wrecked C-47, number on tail 316-342. Natives in vicinity. JENKINS rejoined formation.

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

5 January 1945 (cont'd)

- 1600 - DRAYTON reported sound contact and proceeded to develop it, results negative.
- 1621 - CTU 78.1.3 (LST Group) reported torpedo wake passed 50 feet ahead from starboard to port. RUSSELL directed to search for submarine; results negative.
- 1730 - Screen of TG 78.1 reformed.
- 1808 - Changed formation course and axis to 275° T.
- 1846 - Changed formation course and axis to 293° T.
- 2038 - Changed formation speed to 7 knots.
- 2112 - Changed course and axis from 293° T to 310° T.
- 2350 - Changed course and axis from 310° T to 330° T.

Positions: 0800 - Latitude 9°-20' N, Longitude 124°-24.5' E.
1200 - Latitude 9°-05' N, Longitude 123°-53' E.
2000 - Latitude 8°-56' N, Longitude 122°-47.5' E.

IMPORTANT MESSAGES RECEIVED

CTG 77.3 despatch regarding midget submarine attack on TG 77.3 from position 7 miles south of APO Island. Two torpedoes passed through disposition missing all ships. Submarine was attacked by TAYLOR (DD 468) who rammed and depth charged after visually sighting midget submarine approximately 60 feet long. Probable kill. TAYLOR damaged sound gear. No other damage.

ComAF 5 despatch stating there is no change in Philippine air estimate totals. Regrouping of table.

LUZON

253 Fighters and other Single-Engine Aircraft
21 Twin-engine Fighters
90 Twin-engine Bombers
364 Total LUZON

VISAYAS

40 Fighters and other Single-engine Aircraft
9 Twin-engine Bombers
49 Total VISAYAS

MINDANAO

13 Fighters and Single-engine Aircraft
10 Twin-engine Bombers
23 Total MINDANAO

Total for Philippines - 436. Note: First category includes single-engine fighters which predominate. Light bombers, dive bombers and other single-engine aircraft often used interchangeably with fighters.

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

5 January 1945 (cont'd)

Com3rdFlt despatch relative plan to maintain continuous target CAP over LUZON fields S-3.

CTF 77 despatch relative to estimates maximum JAP fleet units available for use in defense of LUZON:

EMPIRE - FORMOSA Area - 4 BB, 2 CV, 2 CVL, 1 CVE, 2 CA, 3 CL, 15 DD, 43 SS.

PHILIPPINES - 5 DD, 11 SS.

SINGAPORE - FRENCH INDO-CHINA - 2 BB-XCV, 2 CA, 2 CL, 15 DD.

Also air estimates and speculation on resistance. Also CTG 77.2 despatch regarding inability of radar against low level JAP suicides.

CTF 77 despatch regarding inability locate enemy force which departed CAMRANH BAY - CAPE ST. JACQUES area 30 December. Submarines informed primary mission to prevent undetected approach this force into PHILIPPINE area.

6 January 1945
(S-3 Day)

WEATHER

Fair and intermittently cloudy. Sea moderate.

OPERATIONS

Enroute objective area. TG 78.1 in cruising disposition C-3. Course and axis 330° T, speed 7 knots. CTF 78 and CTG 78.1 in BLUE RIDGE. BLUE RIDGE guide in station 0.5090.

0031 - Bogies reported bearing 050° T, distance 12 miles. Bogies consisting of approximately 15 planes passed over formation at about 5,000 feet on southerly course - no action resulted.

0205 - Bogies reported bearing 180° T, distance 64 miles. Passed over stern of formation on northerly course - no action resulted.

0342 - Bogie reported bearing 145° T, distance 31 miles. Passed over stern of formation in northeasterly course - no action resulted.

0549 - One bogie began closing on opposite and parallel course and passed abeam about 2 miles.

0554 - BLUE RIDGE went to G.Q.

0712 - BLUE RIDGE secured from G.Q.

0741 - Changed course and axis to 345° T.

0817 - Changed speed of formation to 8 knots.

0858 - PC 598 came alongside port quarter to pick up mail for delivery to various ships present.

0905 - PC 598 cleared side.

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

6 January 1945 (cont'd)

- 1217 - Changed course and axis to 000° T.
- 1422 - Changed course and axis to 340° T.
- 1600 - Changed course and axis to 327° T.
- 1847 - Changed course and axis to 340° T.
- 1926 - Changed speed to 8.5 knots.
- 2114 - Changed speed to 9 knots.

Positions: 0800 - Latitude 9°-49' N, Longitude 121°-55' E.
1200 - Latitude 10°-19.3' N, Longitude 121°-44' E.
2000 - Latitude 11°-12' N, Longitude 121°-22' E.

IMPORTANT MESSAGES RECEIVED

CTG 77.2 despatch to Com7thFlt listing damage to TG 77.2 ships.
CTG 77.2 despatch to Com7thFlt further lists damage to ships, considers CVEs entirely inadequate cover, recommends 3rdFlt be ordered to area immediately to provide additional air and surface cover.

CTF 77 despatch to Com3rdFlt requests consideration be given moving 3rdFlt to westward of LUZON to give direct air support objective area especially during period loaded transports are in the area. Also requests smothering as many enemy airfields in LINGAYEN as possible.

CTF 77 despatch requests 3rdFlt repeat S-3 strikes in LUZON on S-2 in view of damage by suicide planes to TG 77.2

Com3rdFlt despatch to CTF 77 and CinCSWPA states that in view CTF 77 request Task Force 38 would strike LUZON on S-2.

ComAAFSWPA despatch states that the 3rd Fleet Air would not be operating in the LUZON Area on 7 January.

No important messages issued.

7 January 1945

(S-2 Day)

WEATHER

Partly cloudy. Sea moderate to rough.

OPERATIONS

Enroute objective area on course and axis 340° T, speed 9 knots, in cruising disposition C-3. CTF 78 and CTG 78.1 guide (BLUE RIDGE) in station 0.5090.

0356 - Changed course and axis to 355° T.

0425 - Changed course and axis to 005° T.

0447 - Changed course and axis to 345° T.

0500 - Task Unit 77.10.3 (Tanker group) from MINDORO was sighted bearing 355° T, distance 20 miles. Tankers closed formation and were assigned to each group for fueling escorts. PECOS was assigned to TG 78.1.

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SECRET

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

7 January 1945 (cont'd)

0505 - Changed course and axis to 331° T.
0700 - MONTPELIER reported bomb splash on starboard bow.
0704 - NICHOLAS Opened fire.
0730 - PECOS took station astern of formation and commenced fueling Task Group 78.1.
0832 - Changed course and axis to 320° T.
0837 - Bogie sighted visually on starboard bow. Identified as NELL.
0849 - CAP shot down the NELL.
0910 - Changed course and axis to 304° T.
1100 - TU 78.3.17 left formation astern of LSTs of TF 79 and proceeded to MINDORO.
1219 - Changed speed of formation to 9 knots.
1603 - Changed course and axis to 325° T, changed speed to 8 knots.
1645 - P-38 dropped message to SHAW for delivery to BLUE RIDGE.
1655 - Fueling of formation completed.
1742 - Emergency Victor signal hoisted, unidentified planes on radar screen.
1755 - All clear, planes identified as friendly.
1804 - Changed course and axis to 350° T.
1811 - Enemy aircraft on radar. Hoisted Emergency Victor and passed "Flash Red" on R/T circuits.
1816 - One enemy plane shot down by TG 77.3.
1827 - LST of TG 78.1 reported two bombs dropped. Enemy plane shot down. LST 918 was crashed dived by enemy plane, killing four and wounding four, and causing minor material damage to ship.
1837 - Passed all clear on R/T circuits. Emergency Victor hauled down.
1857 - Changed speed to 9 knots.
2000 - Changed to Battle Disposition One, four DDs on both flanks five miles from axis, one DD in van five miles from center. DEs, PCs, and SCs on screen as before.
2055 - PBY Tomcat reported an unidentified ship at 060° T, 30 miles on course 220° T.
2156 - BLUE RIDGE picked up Skunk bearing 068, distance 19.5 miles on course 280° T, speed 16 knots. PBY Tomcat was directed to circle and observe.
2204 - Asked CTU 78.7.1 if he saw Skunk and received negative reply.
2210 - Told CTU 78.7.1 Skunk bore 066°, distance 16 miles, close and destroy.
2220 - CTU 78.7.1 requested permission to fire star shell spread and was answered affirmative.
2255 - TU 78.7.1 sank Skunk identified as a HATSUHARU Class DD. It was seen to explode and sink.

Positions: 0800 - Latitude 12°-38' N, Longitude 120°-43.5' E.
1200 - Latitude 12°-58' N, Longitude 120°-18.7' E.
2000 - Latitude 13°-46.3' N, Longitude 119°-32.7' E.

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

7 January 1945 (cont'd)

IMPORTANT MESSAGES RECEIVED

CTF 77 despatch to 3rdFlt reports possibility major portion JAP Fleet hitherto in ~~EMPIRE~~ is at sea to westward of KYUSHU - estimate possibility arrival LINGAYEN night of 9-10.

Com3rdFlt despatch to CinCPac, CinCSWPA, CTF 77, etc. reports that TF 38 refuels on 8 January and would not be available for strikes or cover except upon recommendation of MacARTHUR or KINKAID to contrary. Com3rdFlt would decide whether to strike FORMOSA or LUZON, advising interested commands on 9 January.

CinCPOA despatch to CinCSWPA expresses desire to limit operations 3rdFlt in SOUTH CHINA SEA to period necessary to accomplish cover accordance previous concepts - ~~requests comment on CTF 77 061824 (based upon CTG 77.2 recommendations escort carriers entirely inadequate and requesting direct 3rd Flt cover).~~

CTG 77.2 despatch to Com7thFlt states no attacks made on 77.2 today until 1944 and damage much lighter than previous day. Assigns reason as obscure but probably due to steppedup counter air activity by Blue Forces.

CTG 77.2 despatch to Com7thFlt relates additional damage to ships (modifying foregoing despatch) - grand total of 25 ships sunk or damaged.

CTG 77.3 despatch to CTF 78.1 states covering group will take position on our western flank, referencing our despatch regarding possibility attack of enemy light force tonight from west.

ComAF 5 despatch to CinCSWPA etc. sets forth air intent for 8 January.

CinCSWPA ^{Philippines} despatch to CG Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C. states that indications from ~~are~~ are that suicide bombers are coming from FORMOSA and concentrated effort to maximum extent is required to neutralize JAP air. Bomber mission of Twentieth BomCom for KEELUNG HARBOR on 5-1 requested to be changed to FORMOSA.

IMPORTANT MESSAGES SENT

CTF 78 despatch to CTG 78.5 and CTU 79.11.3 info 77.3 states that enemy surface flank attacks from Manila Bay area and from the west might occur, and form destroyers into anti-light Force screens at sundown to meet possible threat.

CTG 78.1 to TG 78.7.1 sets forth battle plan for possible enemy light surface force attack on convoy during darkness.

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

7 January 1945 (cont'd)

CTG 78.1 despatch to 77.3, 78.5, 78.1.2 and 79.1.13 sets forth substance battle plan with 4 DDs on each flank, distance 5 miles with 1 DD picket in van at same distance. Concentration was authorized in event of strong attack.

8 January 1945
(S-1 Day)

WEATHER

Partly cloudy. Sea moderate and slight.

OPERATIONS

Steaming as before on course 350°, speed 9 knots in disposition modified Battle One.

0020 - CTU 78.7.11 reported no damage received by any of our ships in attack on NIP destroyer.

0120 - Red and white flares dropping at distance, bearing approximately 290° T. Continued intermittently until 0400.

0324 CTG 77.3 (cruiser covering force) commenced diring AA.

0327 - CTG 77.3 ceased firing. Numerous bogies picked up throughout period 0000 to 0500. Night fighters shot down 4 JAP planes.

0500 - Two bombs straddled an LST of 78.1.3 - no damage.

0615 - Changed cruising disposition from modified battle disposition One to C-3.

0645 - All ships on station in cruising disposition C-3. During period 0645 to 0800 subject to air attacks. KADASHAN BAY hit by suicide plane. CALLAWAY (APA 35) leading ship in starboard column of TG 78.5 hit by suicide plane.

0845 - Changed course and axis to 000° T.

1025 - Changed course and axis to 015, speed 7.5 knots.

1035 - PC 1129 came alongside to receive mail.

1155 - P-38 made photographic mail drops by SHAW for delivery this

Command.

1336 - Changed speed to 7 knots. BRAINE reported sub contact and attacked.

1340 - BRAINE reported debris consisting of oil and cork on surface over sub contact.

1359 - Instituted hunter-killer procedure with two TBFs and the BRAINE.

1406 - Changed speed to 7 knots.

1420 - MUSTIN relieved BRAINE on hunter-killer duty.

1500 - Discontinued hunter-killer procedure.

1615 - PC 1129 cleared side.

1640 - Changed course and axis to 030° T.

1805 - Changed course and axis to 051° T.

1850 - FAYETTE and HEYWOOD exchanged positions in formation.

1935 - Changed course and axis of formation to 072° T.

2017 - Changed course and axis to 092° T, speed 6 knots.

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

8 January 1945 (cont'd)

2130 - Changed course and axis to 110° T.
2210 - Changed course and axis to 130° T. Bogie on radar screen closed to $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles and snooped for about 20 minutes then left area.

Positions: 0800 - Latitude $15^{\circ}-31'$ N, Longitude $119^{\circ}-06'$ E.
1200 - Latitude $16^{\circ}-00'$ N, Longitude $119^{\circ}-05.5'$ E.
2000 - Latitude $16^{\circ}-50'$ N, Longitude $119^{\circ}-37.6'$ E.

IMPORTANT MESSAGES RECEIVED

CTG 77.2 despatch to Com7thFlt - report of operations bombardment, etc., stating defenses not in strength as previously reported, and reduced shelling accordingly.

CTG 77.2 despatch to Com7thFlt - report of bombardment landing area on S-2 and inspection of beach approach areas with UDTs, etc., revealed little in way of heavy defenses and no mines, few obstacles, in GULF.

ComAF 5 to miscellaneous addrees reporting results of air strikes on S-2.

CinCSWPA despatch to CinCPOA - states bulk of enemy air attacking forces are from FORMOSA - outlines SWP Air Force cover for LUZON - recommends 3rdFlt strike FORMOSA as planned - in case of emergency will call for direct support of 3rdFlt for assault forces.

CinCPOA despatch (reenciphering Gen. Arnold's despatch to CinCSWPA) approves Gen. MacArthur's request for diversion Super Forts from KEELUNG to SHINCHIKU airdrome.

IMPORTANT MESSAGES SENT

CTF despatch to CTF 77 - report of night destroyer action on 7th and sinking of JAP HATSUKARU Class DD.

CTF 78 despatch to TG 78.1 - warns all ships to be alert for floating mines reported in LINGAYEN GULF.

9 January 1945
(S-Day)

WEATHER

Partly cloudy. At objective area. Sea slight.

OPERATIONS

Task Group 78.1 in company with TG 78.5 and TU 79.11.3 proceeding to LINGAYEN GULF in accordance with CTFs OpPlan 103-44. Cruising in disposition C-3, course and axis 130° , speed 6 knots.

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

9 January 1945 (cont'd)

- 0000 - Screen ceased patrolling.
- 0030 - Closed screening vessels to 1400 yards from axis and decreased interval to 700 yards. Assumed modified disposition C-3.
- 0100 - Changed axis and course to 145°.
- 0110 - Changed speed to 5 knots.
- 0205 - Changed course and axis to 162°.
- 0345 - Changed course and axis to 160°.
- 0451 - Changed formation course and axis to 157°.
- 0543 - Changed formation course and axis to 155°.
- 0646 - Executed "Deploy". TG 78.1 proceeded in accordance with CTG 78.1 Attack Order No. 2-44.
- 0742 - Anchored in LINGAYEN GULF off WHITE Beach Transport Area.

The remaining chronological events and operations of 9 January 1945 (S-Day) are shown in detail on the following pages - 1 through 4.

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

9 January 1945 (cont'd)

- 0646 - Deployed.
- 0700 - Bombardment commenced.
- 0823 - WHITE MARSH and EPPING FOREST completed discharging LCTs.
- 0828 - LST Group A to ComLSTFlots - All LVTs have been launched at WHITE Beaches 1, 2, 3.
- 0844 - CTG 78.5 to CTF 78 - Recommend H-hour as designated.
- 0909 - First wave 1300 yards from beach.
- 0909 - From CSA -- Air observers now on station on WHITE and BLUE Beaches - will report in progress of initial waves.
- 0910 - Rocket fire commended on all three beaches.
- 0926 - First, second and third waves 500, 600 and 700 yards from WHITE Beaches.
- 0930 - First wave landed WHITE Beach.
- 0931 - First wave 300 yards off BLUE Beach.
- 0935 - Second wave 400 yards off BLUE Beach.
- 0935 - Third wave 800 yards off BLUE Beach.
- 0938 - Assault troops landed on WHITE Beach 3.
- 0940 - Waves meeting no opposition on BLUE Beach.
- 0946 - No opposition on WHITE Beach - troops proceeding favorably.
- 1000 - WHITE Beach 3 - troops receiving enemy mortar fire (air observer).
- 1007 - LSMs receiving mortar fire from WHITE Beach 3.
- 1015 - ~~Mortar~~ fire still falling on WHITE Beach 3.
- 1027 - From CTG 78.5 - Eight waves had landed by 1000.
- 1031 - Alligators are 2000 yards inland from BLUE Beach 1.
- 1032 - LSMs have landed on WHITE Beach 2.
- 1038 - LSMs grounded 75 to 100 yards off WHITE Beach 3 - surf negligible.
- 1040 - From Control Officer WHITE Beach - All ships up to now have unloaded and retracted at WHITE 2. Am sending in first LSTs - have sandy beach; vehicles can travel over it - 2 fathom curve is 50 yards from beach 1038.
- 1051 - Enemy gun firing to left of WHITE Beach 1 - reported by JENKINS. JENKINS assisted by MINNEAPOLIS will oppose. (From Naval Gunfire).
- 1057 - All LSM clear of WHITE 1.
- 1058 - Troops on WHITE Beach 300 yards inland (air observer).
- 1059 - LSMs have unloaded and cleared WHITE Beach 2.
- 1100 - From 78.5 - LCIs and LSMs on BLUE Beach.
- 1129 - All battalion landing team #1 personnel from Fuller despatched as boats are available.
- 1130 - From 78.1, 2 to TransDivs 7, 24, 6 (info 78) All ships which are unloading close beaches about 5000 yards as soon as practicable retaining approximately same relative positions.
- 1158 - LST 469 beached 75 feet from shore line - she has about four feet of water from her bow - other ships should beach at greater speed.
- 1205 - Our troops have entered SAN FABIAN - white flag hoisted on building in SAN FABIAN. (CSA)
- 1214 - From 78.5 - DD HODGES reports suicide BETTY hit at 0725 - all radio and radar out - I will equip with SCR 603.

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

9 January 1945 (cont'd)

- 1220 - From 78.1.4 - LSMs on WHITE 3 require assistance of tractors and have requested this assistance of beachmaster.
- 1225 - From beachmaster - LSM 219 casualty report from mortar fire on WHITE Beach 3: 6 Navy wounded; one dead -- 7 Army wounded; 2 dead.
- 1230 - From 78.1.2 - Battalion landing team #3 personnel from WAYNE despatched to beach at 1201.
- 1245 - From 78.5 - First LST on BLUE Beach but requires pontoons to unload. From 78.1.3 - request permission to beach LST 466 on WHITE 2 rather than on WHITE 3 because of better beach there.
- 1248 - From Boat Control WHITE Beach to beachmaster WHITE 3 (intercept) - ~~Pontoons are being put out to LSTs. LSTs have started to unload. APAs have started to unload cargo.~~
- 1249 - All LSMs on WHITE 1 and 2 unloaded - none on WHITE 3.
- 1250 - From 79.1 to 79.5 - Direct LST 741 and 631 proceed to BLUE Beach and report to 78.5 for unloading.
- 1258 - WHITE Beach control to CTF 78 - Unloading on WHITE 1 and 2 proceeding satisfactorily.

WHITE 2 reports he can receive more than he now gets.

WHITE 3 reports no LSTs have started to unload but pontoons are being put out to them.

From 78.1.3 to LST 680 - Proceed to vicinity of CAVALIER. Launch your barges and have them report to CTU 78.1.2 then return vicinity of WHITE Beach and await instructions from me.

- 1300 - From 78.1 to ComTransDiv 6 (info 78.1.2) - WHITE 3 will not be used for unloading LSTs after those now unloading there have completed - all causeways will be shifted to BLUE Beaches and WHITE Beach LSTs unloaded on WHITE 1 and 2 - additional Seabees not available.

From 78.1.2 to 78 - LSM 127 reported damaged and temporarily unavailable for unloading.

From JENKINS to 78.1 - Casualties from shell hit: 3 dead; 2 very seriously injured; 8 injured. Transferring injured to DUPAGE.

- 1300 - From 78.1.2 to 78.1 - (A) As of 1200 CAVALIER 20, FELAND 35, THURAN 2, FAYETTE 30, CAPE JOHN-SON 14, HEYWOOD 34, LEEDSTOWN 40, HERCULES 1, DUPAGE 18, WAYNE 0, FULLER 5, JOHN LAND 0, AQUARIUS 2.
- (B) Beach conditions good. WHITE 1 and 2 beaches best with LSMs grounding within 40 feet of beach and small boats landing direct - WHITE 3, LSMs ground at 75 yards and boats at 40 yards - water transportation adequate - 2 LSMs damaged.
- (C) All APAs and APs of Divs B and C plus DUPAGE of Div. A.

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

9 January 1945 (cont'd)

- 1310 - From 78.1.2 - LSM 219 now proceeding to unload.
- 1317 - MISSISSIPPI hit by suicide.
- 1318 - From AUSTRALIA to CTF 77 - Suicide hit AUSTRALIA - Superficial damage - no casualties - air warning radar completely out.
- 1320 - (intercept) - LST 470 took hit on main deck - no casualties - LSTs WHITE 1 and 2 under mortar fire.
From 78.1.3 - Following casualties occurred on LCI 72: 1 man killed by explosion of 20mm magazine; one injured. Body has been taken care of and injured man removed for treatment.
Report from 78.5 to 79 (info 78) - Following ships now estimated ready sailing tonight: LEONARD WOOD, PIERCE, O'HARA, LA SALLE, BELLE GROVE, SUMPTER, STORM KING, MONITOR, GUNSTON HALL. (Readdressed to CTF 77, 1415).
- 1400 - From 78.1.2 to 78 - Unloading reports as of 1400 Item: FAYETTE 79, HEYWOOD 41, LEEDSTOWN 55, CAPE JOHNSON 58, HERCULES 2, DUPAGE 30, WAYNE 0, FULLER 0, JOHN LAND 0, AQUARIUS 3.
- 1410 - From LST 123 to 78.1.3 - Mortar fire has stopped.
- 1430 - From 78.1.2 to 78 - Beachmaster WHITE 2 reports mortar fire on WHITE 2 which seems to come from hills behind and to the right. This apparently caused LSTs to stop unloading and retract.
- 1448 - From WHITE Beach control to 78 - Unloading on WHITE 3 now proceeding satisfactorily.
- 1455 - From control officer WHITE Beach: WHITE Beach 1 - Wave 5 hit beach 0954, Wave 6 at 1000, Wave 7 at 1003, WHITE Beach 2 - Wave 5 hit beach at 0953, Wave 6 at 0955, Wave 7 at 1000, Wave 8 at 1005, Wave 9 at 1014, Wave 10 at 1017, WHITE Beach 3 - Wave 5 hit beach at 0954, Wave 6 at 0958, Wave 7 at 1000, Wave 8 at 1011, Wave 9 at 1014, Wave 10 at 1018, Wave 11 at 1021, Wave 12 at 1023.
- 1505 - From LSM 269 to 78.1.4 - We have 4 known dead; 5 missing; 3 injured. We are alongside LST 469.
- 1507 - From Gen. WING - ComdGen 43rd Div - Assumed command by forces ashore at 1430.
From 78.1 to CTF 77; CG 6th Div and 43rd Div - have assumed command ashore.
- 1515 - From 78.5 - 5 LSTs ready to sail.
- 1558 - From 78 to 78.1.2 (info 78.5, ComLST Flots) - This refers only to LSTs. As soon as LSTs now unloading at WHITE 3 are completed shift causeways to BLUE Beaches. Shift all causeways previously scheduled for WHITE Beaches to BLUE Beaches. LSTs scheduled to unload on WHITE 3 will unload on WHITE 1 and 2. Above arrangement made after conference Commanding General 1st Corps. Pass this to senior control officer.
- 1600 - 78.1.2 reports to 78 - CAVALIER 95, GOLDEN CITY 98, THUBAN 8, CAPE JOHNSON 100, FAYETTE 100.
- 1629 - From CTF 78 to CTF 79 - In addition to ships already reported to you by 78.5, following ships of this force ready to sail tonight. CAVALIER, FILLAND, GOLDEN CITY, THUBAN, SHADWELL, FAYETTE, HEYWOOD, LEEDSTOWN, CAPE JOHNSON, HERCULES,

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

9 January 1945 (cont'd)

- WHITE MARSH, EPPING FOREST, DUPAGE, LST 474, LST 467. Escorts STERRETT, WILSON, LAVALETTE, JENKINS, HODGES damaged but available. LAVALETTE is senior escort.
- 1650 - From ComLST Flots to CTF 78 - No fire on WHITE 1 and 2 for over an hour. Have directed ships to be beached and unloaded subject to retraction if again under fire. At daylight will beach all remaining WHITE Beach ships for unloading and departure tomorrow. No ships can unload BLUE Beach without aid pontoons. 1700 report: A2 - B 8 - C as per my verbal report.
- 1655 - From 78.1.2 to 78.1 - 1600 unloading report: DUPAGE 65, WAYNE 18, FULLER 14, ~~WHITE~~ LAND 1, AQUARIUS 6.
- 1700 - From 78.1.2 to 78.1 - 1700 report - (A)

(A) All APAs and APs, LSD 6 and 7 100 percent; HERCULES and THUBAN under 5 percent. DUPAGE 100, WAYNE 24, FULLER 19, JOHN LAND 5, AQUARIUS 6.

(B) Beaches WHITE 1 and 2 unloading slowed to heavy mortar fire and lack of adequate shore facilities. WHITE 3 good. Water transportation adequate except for slow boat turn around from WHITE 1 and 2. Ships reported unloaded will be ready to sail as soon as boats are hoisted.

- 1744 - From WHITE Beachmaster 3 to CTF 78 - Cannot unload LSMs on WHITE 3 - advise AKAs not to use LSMs to unload cargo.
- 2100 - From COLORADO - Hit during air attack at 1906 I by other ships fire or by small bombs. Starboard 5-inch 25 director seriously damaged and out of commission. Extensive damage to equipment and communications in air defense station. Practically all key anti-aircraft control personnel killed or wounded. Amplifying report later.
- 2130 - From CTF 78 to CTG 78.5, OTU 78.1.2, OTU 78.1.3, OTU 78.1.4, Control officer, Beachmasters - Continue discharging throughout night. LSTs and LSMs scheduled to unload on WHITE 3 will unload on WHITE 2. Should beaches be taken under fire while unloading all vessels retract and stand by for recall by control officer. All ships black out in case of red alert.

* All times shown are Item time.

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

9 January 1945 (cont'd)
(S-Day)

IMPORTANT MESSAGES RECEIVED

Com3rdFlt despatch to CinCPac reports FORMOSA, ISKIGAKI, MIYAKO, OKINAWA under attack and tactical surprise achieved.

ComAF 5 estimate of Philippine enemy air strength - no change from last report.

CinCSWPA to CG Army Air Forces, Washington, D.C., requesting neutralizing air effort by 20th Air Force against FORMOSA to lessen air attacks against LINGAYEN base during critical period of Mike 1 Operation.

Ships Damaged

HODGES (DE 231) hit by suicide dive at 0725.

JENKINS (DD 447) hit by shell; 2 dead, 2 very seriously injured, and 8 injured.

AUSTRALIA - suicide hit - superficial damage to superstructure; no casualties.

MISSISSIPPI (BB 41) suicide hit - damage to ship's guns, 37 holes in ship's side, 4 blisters; 12 dead, 59 injured.

LST 470 - took hit on main deck from mortar fire from beach; no casualties.

LCT 72 - Explosion of 20MM magazine; one killed and one injured.

LSM 127 - From mortar fire.

LSM 269 - From mortar fire; four known dead, 5 missing, 3 injured.

LSM 219 - From enemy shell; several casualties.

COLORADO (BB 45) - Hit during air attack LINGAYEN at 1906
Item by other ship's fire or by small bombs. Extensive damage to equipment and communications-in-air defense station. Practically all key anti-aircraft control personnel killed or wounded.

COLUMBIA (CL 56) - Again hit by suicide plane. Heavy casualties.

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

9 January 1945 (cont'd)
(S-Day)

Enemy Losses:

Seventy-nine planes shot down. Sank two destroyers, midget submarine and a cargo ship.

10 January 1945
(S+1 Day)

WEATHER

Fair and partly cloudy.

OPERATIONS

Anchored in LINGAYEN GULF, LUZON, P.I. Unloading continued. SHAW and STACK assigned gunfire mission during night of 9-10 January. MUS-TIN, DRAYTON and RUSSELL close in anti-submarine patrol and AA screen for transports. No bogies reported.

0350 - LST 925 reported enemy attacking in small boat.
0357 - Warned TG 78.1 regarding attacking boats. Several ships reported being attacked, ~~none of which were in TG 78.1.~~
0525 - Flash * Blue, Control Yellow.
0605 - Flash Red, Control Yellow.
0630 - OTU 78.1.5 commenced smoking to blanket TG 78.1.
0640 - Flash Red, Control Green.
0738 - Flash White, Control Green.
1358 - Photo drop from TBM.
LAVALLETTE, JENKINS, LANG, PEIFFER, AUSBURNE, BRAINE, CONVERSE, FOOTE, NICKEL, KIMMEL departed with convoy - TransDiv 6 less HER-CULES and TransDiv 24 less AQUARIUS, plus BARNSTABLE, BANNER, ELECTRA, ELMORE, LSTs 475, 474, 452, 470, 22, 667, 460, 451, 123, 488, 680, 741, 777, 993, 628, 919, 555, 614, 581, 582, 700.
1905 - Flash Red, Control Green.
1925 - Flash Red, Control Yellow.
1940 - Flash White, Control Yellow.
1957 - Flash Red, Control Yellow.
2007 - Flash White, Control Yellow.

* Flash Red - Enemy aircraft in vicinity, attack imminent, set condition I
Flash Blue - Unidentified aircraft in vicinity, attack probable, set condition II.
Flash White - Hostile aircraft not in vicinity, all clear, set condition 3
Control Yellow - Day - Fire upon identified enemy.
Nite - Screening vessels use restricted fire (see CANF, SWPA Plan) AP, AK, hold fire unless ordered.
Control Green - Ships hold fire unless individually attacked. Then use automatic weapons only.

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S E C R E T

SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

10 January 1945 (cont'd)
(S/1 Day)

IMPORTANT MESSAGES RECEIVED.

Naval Liaison Officer, 5th Fighter Command 10237, Item to CTF 77 outlining air intent (navy cover) for 11 January.

CTF 77 100717 to ASP warning regarding JAP swimmers carrying demolition equipment. Directs posting of armed boat patrol by day and sentries on deck at night; warns that swimmers are approaching behind floating boxes.

CTF 77 despatch to CinCSWPA, CominCh, CinCPac, etc. - report on progress of operation on S/1 Day.

11 January 1945
(S/2 Day)

WEATHER

Partly cloudy to fair. Sea slight.

OPERATIONS

0255 - Ceased unloading on WHITE Beach 2 due to JAP infiltration and mortar fire until 0645.

0259 - Flash Blue, control Yellow.

0343 - Flash White, control Yellow.

0544 - Four bogies on screen distance 3 to 10 miles - Flash Red, control Yellow.

0610 - Screen clear - Flash White, control Yellow.

0633 - Layed smoke screen.

0701 - CTG 77.9 reported to CTF 78 and CTF 79 for duty. CTF 78 directed CTG 77.9 to proceed into transport area and prepare to land troops.

0730 - Ceased smoking..

0705 - Flash White, control Green.

0813 - Flash Red, control Green.

0830 - Flash White, control Green.

1111 - Directed RUSSELL to pick up survivors near DANORIS on east shore of bay.

1245 - Flash Blue, control Green.

1328 - Flash White, control Green.

1830 - Commenced smoking.

1857 - Flash Red, control Green. 3 to 4 bogies on screen various bearings and distances - one passed close aboard - about 500 yards ahead at 200 feet.

1940 - Flash Red, control Yellow.

2022 - Flash White, control Yellow.

2059 - Flash Blue, control Yellow.

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CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

11 January 1945 (cont'd)
(S/2 Day)

2111 - Flash Red, control Yellow.
2126 - Flash White, control Yellow.

IMPORTANT MESSAGES RECEIVED

ComAF 5 to AOIC ComBomWing 309 and 310 - No change Philippine enemy air strength estimate.

CTF 77 to CTF 78, info CTF 79 and CG 6th Army. Requests Admiral Barbey remain LINGAYEN until departure S/5 convoy conforming to paragraph 3(m) my OpPlan 17-44.

IMPORTANT ComGrp6PhibsPac despatch to Com7thPhib - ComPhibGrp6,, Rear Admiral Royal in ROCKY MOUNT reports for duty in accordance CTF 77 despatch 102348.

CTF 77 despatch to CTF 77.7 - 1 big SKUNK, 20 little SKUNKS at San Fernando. Proceed immediately and get them. Air cover being provided.

IMPORTANT MESSAGES SENT

CTF 78 to CTF 77 - Summary of unloading data for 10 January up to 1000 on 11 January: All CTF 78 Echelon G1 LSTs have unloaded less five BLUE Beach ships which have been shifted to WHITE to complete discharge. All CTF 78 G1 transports have unloaded less HERCULES, THUBAN, ARNEB, AURIGA, JUPITER, LCTs and larger types are not using BLUE Beach due to bad surf conditions at WHITE 3 Beach LSTs ground 400 to 500 feet from beach, LSMs and LCTs ground 100 to 150 feet from beach, small craft have difficulty retracting when surf runs. WHITE 3 secured from 1930 to 0730 because of enemy mortar fire. Traffic now normal. WHITE 1 and 2 secured from 0130 to 0530 for same reason.

Com SAN FABIAN Attack Force despatch to Com LUZON Attack Force, info 6th Army - Major General Swift has assumed command "I" Corps ashore 112010/I.

Despatch sent to ASP who could make smoke to do so at following hours: 0630 to 0730 and from 1830 to 1945.

12 January 1945
(S/3 Day)

WEATHER

Partly cloudy to fair. Sea calm.

OPERATIONS

0000 - 0400 watch -- anchored as before.
0611 - Flash Blue, control Yellow.

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SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

12 January 1945 (cont'd)

(S/3 Day)

0616 - Flash Red, control Yellow.
0630 - Make smoke.
0656 - Flash Red, control Green.
0745 - Stop smoking.
0747 - Flash White, control Green.
0753 - Flash Red, control Green.
0758 - Continued unloading.
- Flash Red, control Green. Enemy plane, type SALLY.
sighted visually. VALS reported in area.
0810 - Commenced smoking.
0835 - Ceased smoking.
0844 - Flash White, control Green.
1200 - 1600 watch -- As before. No remarks.
1600 - 1800 watch -- Anchored as before.
1830 - Make smoke.
1849 - Flash Red, control Yellow.
1851 - Flash Red, control Green.
1900 - Flash Blue, control Yellow.
1927 - Flash White, control Yellow.
1945 - Stop making smoke.
2318 - Continued unloading. Beachmaster WHITE Beach 2 reported
WHITE Beach 2 under fire.

IMPORTANT MESSAGES RECEIVED

Com LUZON Attack Force despatch to all TFCs, TGCs, 7thFlt, Com7thFlt. - Effective upon departure CTF 79 from LINGAYEN area on 12 January CTF 78 will assume responsibility for the continuing tasks in the objective area assigned by my OpPlan 17-44 to the commanders SAN FABIAN and LINGAYEN Attack Forces and for the conduct of such additional minor amphibious operations as may become necessary for support of the LINGAYEN Operation.

Effective immediately CTF 78 is charged with the performance of all administrative duties of SOPA LINGAYEN GULF. While maintaining their identity as separate task group and unit commanders CTG 77.6, 77.7, 77.8 and CTU 77.10.2 will report to the Administrative SOPA for coordination of all operations and activities in LINGAYEN GULF.

Upon his departure from LINGAYEN area CTF has designated Rear Admiral Royal (CTG 78.1) in ROCKY MOUNT his representative as Senior Amphibious Force Commander and as Administrative SOPA LINGAYEN GULF.

Com LUZON Attack Force Secret despatch to CinC, SWPA - At dawn reenforcement group arrived LINGAYEN GULF and during the day landed all units of 158 RCT and 25th Infantry Division on the beaches. Unloading was again handicapped due to unfavorable surf conditions. Troops ashore continued to advance generally unopposed except at one or two points where opposition was light. Enemy air today was negligible, etc. At 1530 today Commanding General 14th Corps assumed command ashore.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

SECRET

SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

12 January 1945 (cont'd)
(S/3 Day)

ComAF 5 despatch to ComBowWing 310, ComBowWing 309 - Change estimates Philippine enemy air strength as follows:

LUZON

172 Single-engine aircraft.
11 Twin-engine fighters.
67 Twin-engine bombers.
250 Total.

VISAYAS

18 Single-engine aircraft.
0 Twin-engine fighters.
7 Twin-engine bombers.
25 Total.

MINDANAO

7 Single-engine aircraft.
0 Twin-engine fighters.
4 Twin-engine bombers.
11 Total.

286 aircraft - total estimated Philippine enemy air strength.

IMPORTANT MESSAGES SENT

CTF 78 (Com SAN FABIAN Attack Force) despatch to ComPhibGr 6 - Upon departure CTF 79, CTG 79.2 assume responsibility for amphibious activities LINGAYEN Beaches. Originator continue responsibility for SAN FABIAN Beaches.

Ships Damaged

LST 700 - Near miss resulted in 3 killed, 2 wounded and damage loss of engines.

DICKERSON (APD 27) - Departing LINGAYEN was hit by 20MM suffering 13 wounded nil serious.

OTIS SKINNER (merchant ship) - At 121230/I single plane crashed in side number 2 hold-with smoldering but no casualties.

LST 778 - Numerous casualties and minor damage from near miss.

JOHN KYLE (merchant ship) - Suicide plane crashed on deck over number 2 hold. Many casualties.

D.D. FIELD (merchant ship) - Had near miss causing minor engine room damage and a few casualties.

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SECRET

SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

13 January 1945

(S/4 Day)

WEATHER

Partly cloudy to cloudy. Sea slight.

OPERATIONS

0125 - Flash Blue, control Yellow.
0148 - Flash White, control Yellow.
0930 - CTG 78.9 (G-3 Echelon) arrived in LINGAYEN GULF.
1704 - Flash Red, control Green.
1741 - Flash White, control Green.
1830 - Commenced making smoke.
1930 - Flash Blue, control Yellow.
1945 - Stopped making smoke.
1952 - Flash White, control Yellow.

IMPORTANT MESSAGES RECEIVED

CTF 77 despatch to CinCSWPA (BOISE), CinCSWPA LYTE, CinCSWPA Hollandia - Commanding General 6th Army assumes command of all 6th Army forces ashore 13 January at 1430 I.

IMPORTANT MESSAGES SENT

Com SAN FABIAN Attack Force (CTF 78) despatch to Com LUZON Attack Force (CTF 77) - Status of unloading SAN FABIAN Beaches: 4 transports, 7 cargo ships completed unloading as of 0800. 8 LSTs from Echelon G-2 completed unloading at WHITE Beaches, 3 are unloading. At BLUE Beach 4 LSTs now unloading using 3 pontoons. 2 AKs unloading at BLUE. No hostile gunfire at BLUE Beaches. Cargo removal from each good. WHITE 3 removal of cargo is very satisfactory. Ships at WHITE 1 and 2 include 4 LSTs, 4 LSMs, 2 LCMs. Unloading slow due to shortage of men. No hostile gunfire all yesterday, intermittent during night. WHITE 1 cluttered with cargo. Unloading at LINGAYEN Beaches follows. Overnight all LSMs completed initial unloading. 7 LSTs completed unloading. 4 now unloading. Beaches satisfactory.

CTF 78 despatch to (CTG 79.1) Com Attack Group Able - Rear Admiral Kiland in MOUNT McKINLEY will sail tonight as OTC fast convoy. Turn over CTG 79.1 details of beach situation to CTG 79.2.

Enemy Losses

15 enemy planes were destroyed - 10 by CAP, 2 by AA, and 3 splashed.

14 January 1945

(S/5 Day)

WEATHER

Partly cloudy to fair. Sea slight.

- 24 -

(71)

68

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By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

SECRET

SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTION

14 January 1945 (cont'd)
(S/5 Day)

OPERATIONS

0535 - Flash Blue, control Yellow.
0551 - Flash White, control Yellow.
0631 - Flash White, control Green.
0711 - Flash Red, control Green.
0714 - Flash White, control Green.
0800 - 1800 - Anchored as before.
1918 - Flash White, control Yellow.

No important messages received or sent.

15 January 1945
(S/6 Day)

WEATHER

Fair. Sea slight to rough.

OPERATIONS

0620 - Started smoking.
0655 - Flash White, control Green.
0713 - Flash Red, control Green.
0734 - Flash White, control Green.
0800 - 1600 - Anchored as before.
1647 - Underway from anchorage in LINGAYEN GULF, for LEYTE.

No important messages received.

IMPORTANT MESSAGES SENT

CTF 78 despatch to CTF 77 - On departure from LINGAYEN GULF at 151800 of CTF 78 in BLUE RIDGE, the SOPA Administrative duties LINGAYEN GULF will be carried on by ComPhibGr SIX in ROCKY MOUNT with Task Group designation 78.1.

CTF 78 to CTF 77 - Expect to sail BLUE RIDGE, PRESIDENT MONROE, ALGOL, and LIBRA today. Only remaining TG 77.9 cargo ship is NAVAJO VICTORY who is 34 percent unloaded. Progress of unloading at Rainbow Beaches is slow. Yellow Beach conditions unfavorable but 4 causeways are working and should average 6 LSTs per day. WHITE Beaches show improvement over last night. 15 LSTs and 1 LSM beached on WHITE 2. No enemy fire through night on beaches. 11 LSTs completed unloading during night. Cargo entirely clear of WHITE Beach and moved to dump area. 6 LCTs working Liberty ships off WHITE Beach. At BLUE Beach 6 LCTs unloading merchant ships PERKINS and K.S. JOHNSON. Replenishing ammo in BBs using 6 LSMs.

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Authority: E.O. 13526

By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

Reg. No. <i>Om 02668</i>
3 380
R.S. No. _____

A16-3(2)(F-3-4/whr)

Serial *00188*

SECRET
SECRET

28 FEB 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
CTF 78, 7thPhibFor,
secret ltr., serial
0071 of 12 Feb. 1945.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: LINGAYEN Operation - SAN FABIAN Attack Force,
Report of.

1. Forwarded.
2. Commander Task Force 78 is to be congratulated on the smooth operation of the Task Force in effecting this amphibious operation.
3. Recommendation contained in paragraph 20 (f) is concurred in.

T. C. Kinkaid
T. C. KINKAID

Copy to:
CTF 78

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
FLAG OFFICE
RECEIVED

1945 MAR 8 10 09

3 380